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I. INTRODUCTION
Media matters.' But does it matter who owns the media? If it does, should
government decide among buyers in the private market for a television or radio
station who would be the "best" owner of that station or how many stations a
particular owner should hold? If so, is government action in furtherance of its
normative notions of a "better media" in conflict with the First Amendment?
If unregulated ownership of media outlets is harmful for democracy, are there
market-based solutions that can address it so that the Constitution is not
implicated? And finally, what can we learn about the justification, validity,
and effectiveness of ownership regulation by comparing how Western
countries regulate private ownership of the broadcast outlets within their
borders?
For decades, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has enforced
limits on the media holdings of a single owner in the United States at both the
national and local level, and has generally prohibited one entity's joint
ownership of a television station and major newspaper in a single community.2
In 1996 Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act, in which
Section 202(h) mandates that the FCC revisit its media ownership rules on a
regular basis to ensure they continue to serve the public interest.3 The most
1 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, Jan. 16, 1787, in 11 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48-49 (Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., 1950) ("Were it left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."); James Madison, Report on
the Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions to the General Assembly of Virginia (Jan. 7, 1800), quoted
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) ("[T]o the press alone, chequered as it is with
abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and
humanity over error and oppression.").
2 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2008). Roughly, the FCC regulates media ownership in three areas:
(1) the number of individual television or radio stations one entity can own in a local market;
(2) the number of properties across different media (newspaper/television, newspaper/radio, and
radio/television) one entity can own in a local market; and (3) the number of television stations
one entity can own nationally (once measured by overall number of stations, but now measured
by audience reach, discussed infra Part IV.A). Id. The FCC also indirectly bars the joint
ownership of the "Big Four" national networks (i.e., ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) by disallowing
any television station from affiliating with an entity that owns any two of them. See id.
§ 73.658(g).
' Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 & 47 U.S.C.):
Further Commission Review: The Commission shall review its rules adopted
pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules biennially as part of its
regulatory reform review under section II of the Communications Act
of 1934 and shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the
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recent review of the rules began in the fall of 2006, and in December 2007 ex-
Chairman Kevin Martin proposed to relax the rule barring common ownership
of a major newspaper and television station in the same local market; the full
Commission adopted the new rule by a 3-2 vote along party lines.4 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit retained jurisdiction over the ownership
rules it remanded for error in the summer of 2004,' and challenges to the
Commission's recently completed review of those rules are piling up before
that same court.6 With the significant implications an eventual decision will
have for administrative and constitutional law, the U.S. Supreme Court may
well have the last word on any retention, modification, or abolition of the
FCC's media ownership policy.
The FCC's rules all rest on the same presumption: the amount of media
ownership's concentration in private hands relates to the number of viewpoints
expressed in the idea marketplace.7 As the agency has maintained for the last
thirty years, "ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to
choose the methods, manner, and emphasis of presentation."8 Therefore, the
United States, like nearly every Western European country, has adopted some
form of restriction on the ownership of television stations and other media
outlets in addition to any generally applicable provisions from antitrust law.9
public interest as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.
Id. Congress has since amended the statute to provide for quadrennial rather than biennial
review. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3,
§ 629 (2004) (amending Sections 202(c) and 202(h) of the 1996 Act).
4 See 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 9481 (Feb. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter 2006 Media Ownership Order] (narrowing the prohibition on newspaper-broadcast
cross-ownership). As was the case during the last go-round on media ownership, the Democratic
Commissioners have complained on procedure as well as on the merits, and members of
Congress have voiced concerns. See Joint Statement by FCC Comm'rs Michael J. Copps and
Jonathan S. Adelstein on Release of Media Ownership Order (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280001Al.pdf; Letter from fourteen U.S.
Senators to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://dorgan.senate.gov/
documents/newsroom/121707fccvote.pdf (asking the FCC to postpone action on any new rule
changes for additional public comment).
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372,435 (3d Cir. 2004).
6 See Memorandum Order, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Mar. 11, 2008)
(consolidating more than a dozen petitions for review of the 2006 Media Ownership Order in
the Ninth Circuit, which eventually transferred those petitions to the Third Circuit).
' In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1050
(1975).
8 Id.
9 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.3555, 73.658 (establishing guidelines for multiple media ownership);
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The presumption leads to regulation of ownership as a proxy for regulation of
content; if the presumption holds, then providing the widest possible range of
station owners will offer a broad spectrum of content, ensuring a diverse public
discourse among both the stations themselves and the media consumers who
watch and listen to them.'0 The converse of that goal relies on the same
presumption-preventing excessive media ownership in the hands of a few
powerful individuals or entities, which, if allowed, grants them the ability to
shape opinion or exploit the market for personal gain by overrepresenting their
own biases, interests, and viewpoints in public debate." If one looks across
Westem democracies, the policy goal is consistent, 2 but the regulatory
see also GILLIAN DOYLE, MEDIA OWNERSHIP 148 (2002) ("[M]ost member states of the
European Union impose some special restrictions on ownership of the media over and above
safeguards provided by domestic or EU competition law.").
'0 The FCC has articulated the ownership presumption thusly:
[O]utlet ownership can be presumed to affect the viewpoints expressed on an
outlet. The Commission therefore continues to believe that broadcast
ownership limits are necessary to preserve and promote viewpoint diversity.
A larger number of independent owners will tend to generate a wider array
of viewpoints in the media than would a comparatively smaller number of
owners.
Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Multiple
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, 68
Fed. Reg. 46,286 17 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter 2002 Media Ownership Order], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-03-127Al.pdf; see also In re Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. 5341, 5347, 37 (1993) (stating that one of the
"fundamental principles underlying the Commission's multiple ownership rules" is "the
promotion of maximum diversification of program and service viewpoints").
" The Council of Europe, responsible for ensuring compliance with Article 10 of the
European Convention's freedom of expression guarantees, "has defined pluralism in the
following terms: 'media pluralism should be understood as diversity of media supply, reflected,
for example, in the existence of a plurality of independent and autonomous media and a diversity
of media contents available to the public.' " DOYLE, supra note 9, at 12, quoting Council of
Europe, Committee ofExperts on Media Concentration andPluralism, Secretariat Memorandum
prepared by the Directorate of Human Rights, Report on Media Concentrations and Pluralism
in Europe, MM-CM (97) 6. American and European courts have long endorsed the policy goal
of ensuring a diverse range of voices in media. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (diversity of
news sources is a vital interest because the "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out
ofa multitude oftongues"); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court],
May 12, 1987, 57 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 295 F.R.G.
(finding the German Constitution requires the legislature to ensure that private broadcasters
provide a diversity of opinion, or Meinungvielfalt).
12 See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 9, at 6-7, 12.
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mechanisms used to achieve it are quite different. Political tradition defines
and draws parameters around a particular regulatory approach.
For example, in historically interventionist states such as those of Western
Europe, we expect to find relatively strict regulation, of both a structural and
content-based nature, of relatively few outlets in the name of the public
interest. 3 In a historically laissez-faire free market state such as the United
States, we expect to find minimal content regulation and a governmental role
mostly limited to the provision and renewal of broadcast licenses and
management of the broadcast spectrum.' 4 With its lower barriers to entry, the
latter approach would predictably result in more private outlets than in a state-
based system. As this analysis shows below, this prediction proves to be well-
founded." In Western Europe, media's potential as a public good rendered it,
at least for a while, too important to be entrusted to private owners. The public
monopoly was therefore a method of regulating private ownership, in the sense
that the former did not allow for the latter.' 6 Now, however, even the most
interventionist governments are trending toward an increased role for the
market and private ownership in the development of media space.1
7
A comparative look at broadcast regulation provides a means to examine the
ownership presumption's implementation across different countries, and to
determine whether governments are right to assume that a greater number of
media outlet owners are more likely to provide a broad range of content than
a smaller number. The ownership presumption's most prominent detractors,
namely free-market academics and regulators, challenge it via market
segmentation principles. They argue that it is in the economic interest of a
media monopolist to present a diverse range of content, and therefore a market
in which ownership is concentrated results in more pluralism than a market in
which regulation disperses ownership.'" The critique has gained
13 WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, REGULATING MEDIA: THE LICENSING AND SUPERVISION
OF BROADCASTING IN Six COUNTRIES 336 (1996).
14 Id. at 337-39.
" This distinction has also been referred to as the trustee model versus the market model.
Id. at 340-41.
16 Id. at 336-37.
17 Id. at 339-41.
"8 Economic analyses arguing that horizontal concentration can increase program diversity
rely on the Steiner Model, a model of radio markets developed by economist Peter Steiner.
Drastically oversimplified, the Steiner Model, as applied to broadcast television, can be
summarized thusly: assume a television audience with diverse viewing preferences (i.e., of 1000
possible viewers, 500 prefer sports, 200 prefer sitcoms, 150 prefer classical theatre adaptations
and 150 prefer cartoons). If, on the one hand, I have a media monopoly (i.e., I own all four
television stations in the television market), it is in my economic interest to attempt to capture
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traction in the U.S. judiciary as well. 9 But in most democracies the ownership
presumption still holds firm, and nearly every country with media ownership
limits relies on it to justify its policy. Taking a step back, however, the
threshold issue is whether the ownership presumption is a viable or effective
guiding principle upon which to base governmental restrictions upon the
ownership of private property.
Relatedly, to study a country's media regulation is to study the country
itself. Media law is a tool that governments use to advance their societal goals:
it reveals both the present and the aspirational national character. The
regulatory process is a "narrative text about the society" from which we can
learn a country's conception, informed by its particular history, of its own ideal
state of deliberative discourse.2" What is important to note is not merely how
political tradition shapes the end regulatory product, such as the authority of
an agency or the reach of a rule or statute, but how it also informs the debate
that leads to the adoption of those products. Comparing media systems, then,
like all comparative law projects, is a political science exercise as well as a
legal one.2'
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the history of Western European media
ownership concentration, with particular focus on the state media monopoly
model established by the United Kingdom. Part III considers the worldwide
trend toward privatization of media markets, examining it in two senses: as a
the entire audience by showing as broad a variety of programming as possible (i.e., I will show
a different type of programming on each channel). If, on the other hand, each of the four stations
has a different owner, if I were to show sports on channel 1, the owner of channel 2 is more
likely to also show sports to try to win half of my audience-250 viewers--than to show a
sitcom, which will capture only 200 viewers, or either of the other two options, which will each
only net 150 viewers. See Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the
Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 206-07 (1952). Less
theoretically, take the example of Viacom's joint ownership of the CBS and JPN networks
during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Since CBS's demographics tended to skew older, the
parent company could program UPN to directly appeal to a younger audience without fear of
competing with itself for audience members on the national level during prime time.
"9 See Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1992) (favorably
discussing the hypothesis that broadcasting monopolies might promote diversity).
20 See Monroe E. Price, Comparing Broadcast Structures: Transnational Perspectives and
Post-Communist Examples, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 284 (1993) (suggesting that
statutes should be examined in the same way and for the same purpose archaeologists examine
shards: to aid in deciphering, decoding, and explaining civilizations).
21 In this sense, comparing countries' media regulation is also like comparing their media
because "press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures
within which it operates." FRED S. SIEBERT, THEODORE PETERSON & WILBUR ScHRAMM, FOUR
THEORIES OFTHE PRESS 1-2 (1956).
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tool of deconsolidation, in the sense of ending or circumscribing state
broadcasting monopolies, and as a tool of convergence, in the sense of
accumulating media influence in the absence of effective monopoly protection.
Part IV attempts to draw some comparative conclusions from the relevant data,
points out some constitutional problems with ownership regulation in the U.S.
context, and proposes an alternative method--self-regulation, particularly
private contractual agreements between owners and content decision makers
to limit potential ownership abuse of control-to ensure a diversity of
viewpoints in the media space. Part V concludes.
1I. "PERFECTLY" CONSOLIDATED MARKETS: THE STATE As MEDIA
MONOPOLIST IN WESTERN EUROPE
During the pre-broadcast era, consolidated ownership of print media outlets
was the norm.22 In Western Europe during the early part of the twentieth
century, technological advances such as improved transportation and
industrialization of the printing process combined with literacy's spread among
the working classes to create a mass market for media.23 Freshly minted
capitalists invested eagerly in the now-profitable news business.24 In Weimar
Germany, for example, the right-wing Hugenberg press empire, backed by
industrialists who made their fortunes by mining coal in the Ruhr Valley,
controlled hundreds of newspapers and its own news agency.25 Similar market
concentration occurred in France and England after World War 1.26 For the
most part, the European press baron operated in a total free market
environment--one that was highly concentrated and usually partisan.7
Later, broadcasting similarly developed from a tradition of consolidated
ownership; indeed, in Western Europe, broadcasting's ownership history is one
of outright monopoly.28 The monopolist owner, however, was not a private
22 PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MASS MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE 24-27
(1996) (discussing the late nineteenth century move toward liberated press media ownership
after the First World War).
21 Id. at 15, 19, 25.
24 Id. at 25-26.
25 Id. at 26, 68.
26 Id. at 26-27.
27 The American press ownership tradition was similar; before 1920, owners, publishers, and
journalists believed the pursuit of objectivity was at best anomalous and at worst a fool's errand.
See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS 120-22 (1978).
2' HUMPHREYS, supra note 22, at 111-12.
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press baron, but the state.29 The guiding principle, adhered to (although not
strictly followed, as discussed infra) in Western Europe to this day, is that a
public broadcasting service, with the outlet owned by the state but statutorily
insulated from both governmental influence and the pressures of the market,
is the most effective use of the critically valuable broadcast resource and the
best way to ensure a diversity of voices in the media marketplace.30
The fountainhead for the public interest broadcasting model was the UK's
British Broadcasting Corporation. Originally a consortium of private
telecommunications companies licensed by the General Post Office pursuant
to its exclusive authority over telegraphy, the British government established
the BBC as a state-owned broadcasting service in 1927, and its Royal Charter
expressly charges it to present a range of reportage and opinions in the service
of the public interest.3' The BBC's founding was premised on the notion that
broadcasting existed to educate and inform, as well as to entertain, and the
market was not equipped to serve those goals;32 therefore a radio and television
monopoly, whose ownership was vested in the state and divorced from the
profit-seeking motive, could ensure greater quality and diversity in
programming. A monopoly broadcaster simply was better for the viewer and
for the country.
33
29 Id.
30 Id. at 112.
31 Id. at 112-13; see also The BBC Story, History of the BBC, Pre-BBC, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/heritage/story/index.shtml (providing information about the BBC's origin) (last visited
May 12,2009); BBC Charter Review, Background, http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/home/
background.htm (providing the BBC's date of charter) (last visited May 12, 2009);
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL HERITAGE, BROADCASTING, COPY OF THE AGREEMENT DATED
THE 25TH DAY OF JANUARY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATIONAL
HERITAGE AND THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION § 3.2(c), available at http://www.ps
b-review.org.hk/eng/documents/BBC%20Agreement%20with%20the%2OSecy/2OoP/2OState.
pdf (the agreement, accompanying a recent renewal of the BBC's Royal Charter of
Incorporation, states that the broadcasting services it provides must "contain comprehensive,
authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the United Kingdom and
throughout the world to support fair and informed debate at local, regional and national levels").
32 About the BBC: Purpose and Values, http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/purpose (last visited
May 12, 2006). The BBC's tripartite "inform, educate, and entertain" mandate is widely
attributed to John Reith (later Lord Reith, its founding Director General). DEPARTMENT FOR
CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT, BROADCASTING, COPY OF THE ROYAL CHARTER FOR THE
CONTINUANCE OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION 1, available at http://www.bbc.
co.ukfbbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory framework/charter agreement/bbc_royalcharter.pdf;
see also R.H. COASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY 46-48 (1950)
(discussing Reith's emphasis upon expanding the use of broadcasting beyond simple
entertainment, so as to provide edification to the listening public).
"3 Most Western European countries adhere to a similar regulatory premise. See Peter
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Insulation from market pressures also meant foreclosing the use of the
airwaves for advertising; accordingly, the broadcasting service was to be
funded not by the sale of on-air time for commercials, but by a license fee
charged to each home that had a television.34 Other Western European
countries followed Britain's lead in viewing broadcasting as a tool to promote
pluralism, debate, and national identity and in establishing a national broadcast
enterprise to meet those goals.35
Humphreys, The Goal of Pluralism and the Ownership Rules for Private Broadcasting in
Germany: Re-Regulation orDe-Regulation?, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 527, 528 (1998).
In Germany,
it has always been axiomatic that broadcasting fulfil[I]s a special public-
service role. Accordingly, 'broadcasting freedom' cannot be assured by a
laissez faire approach; it has to be both protected by negative restrictions
(e.g., against political interference or dominance by strong social and
economic actors) and positively promoted (e.g., through strong, publicly
accountable and pluralistically representative, public-service broadcasters).
Id. Similar sentiments were expressed, at least initially, during the early days of radio in the
United States. See PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA 338 (2004) (then-Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover stated it was "inconceivable that we should allow so great a
possibility for service, for news, for entertainment, for education, and for vital commercial
purposes, to be drowned in advertising chatter").
34 See INDEPEN, APPRAISING THE PROPOSED BBC LICENSE FEE INCREASE (May 2006), 6-7,
available at http://www.indepen.co.uk/docs/bbclicence fee.pdf. The British government
imposes a yearly license fee, £131.50 in 2006, to each home with a television to fund the BBC.
In 2004 the BBC's revenue from licensing fees alone nearly doubled the advertising revenue of
its largest private broadcast competitor, ITV. Id. The government also imposes the fee on
homes that are not the owners' primary residence; the Oxford short-let apartment in which I
lived while researching this Article was advertised as "TV license-fee included," and our
landlord provided a copy of the license along with the user manuals for our stove, washer-dryer,
and dishwasher.
"5 Freedom of Communication Act, Law No. 86-1087 of Sept. 30, 1986, Journal Officiel de
la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], available at http://www.csa.fr/uplo
ad/dossier/loi_86_english.pdf.
The companies listed in Article 44 and 45 carry out public service
assignments in the public interest. They shall offer the public, taken as a
whole, a group ofprogrammes and services which are characterised by their
diversity and their pluralism, their requirement of quality and innovation,
respect for the rights of the person and of constitutionally defined democratic
principles.
They shall present a diversified offer of programmes in analogue and
digital modes in the areas of information, culture, knowledge, entertainment
and sport. They favour democratic debate, exchanges between different parts
of the population as well as integration into society and citizenship. They
shall promote the French language and highlight cultural and linguistic
heritage in its regional and local diversity. They shall contribute to the
development and broadcasting of intellectual and artistic creation and of
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The BBC was the product of a policy decision that a public monopoly could
do what privately owned media could not: fulfills broadcasting's unique
political and cultural potential.36 Early on, Britons agreed; the monopoly's
uninterrupted twenty-five-year reign was supported, for the most part, by
public opinion." By 1950, however, competition advocates began making
inroads by challenging the rationales offered for continuing the BBC
monopoly. 3 Despite entrenched opposition from pro-monopoly factions,39 in
November 1953 the reigning Conservative Party government published a
White Paper, Memorandum on Television Policy, that spoke out in favor of
introducing competition to British broadcasting.4' After vigorous debate,
Parliament passed the 1954 Television Act, permitting the establishment of the
civic, economic, social, scientific and technical knowledge as well as to
audio-visual and media education.
36 JOHN ELDRIDGE, JENNY KITZINGER & KEvIN WILLIAMS, THE MASS MEDIA AND POWER
IN MODERN BRITAIN 45 (1997).
The decision to set up broadcasting as a public service monopoly in the hands
of the BBC was a clear rejection of the market as means for organizing this
new medium. The central consideration was that the audience would be
treated as citizens rather than consumers and educated to play a full part in
the democratic and cultural life of the nation.
Id.
37 See ASA BRIGGS & PETER BURKE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIA 223 (2002) ("The
Times observed that it has been 'wisely decided to entrust broadcasting in this country to a single
organization with an independent monopoly and with public service as its primary motive.' "
(quoting British Broadcasting, TIMES (UK), Aug. 14, 1934, at 20)); COASE, supra note 32,
at 133 ("It is one of the many advantages of the public ownership and control of the radio that
certain standards have been maintained. We have kept out the advertiser of pills and corn-
plasters and suchlike who holds the American radio in the hollow of his hand." (quoting A.G.
Gardiner, John Bull, May 9, 1936)).
3 For an overview of the commercialization debate, see ASA BRIGGS, THE HISTORY OF
BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: VOLUME IV: SOUNDAND VISION 908-34 (1979), and
H.H. WILSON, PRESSURE GROUP: THE CAMPAIGN FOR COMMERCIAL TELEVISION 50-53 (1961).
The pro-privatization faction included British and American advertisers' lobbies, the radio and
television manufacturing industry, Conservative backbencher Members of Parliament, Prime
Minister Churchill, artists and musical directors' associations interested in earning more pay for
television performances, and financial institutions hoping for a new investment venture.
BRIGGS, supra; WILSON, supra. The commercial television coalition in the UK shared many
similarities with the one in Germany decades later. While a limited amount of advertising was
permissible on publicly owned channels under German communications law, in the early 1980s,
German advertisers lobbied for private channels in the hopes that competition would reduce the
price of on-air advertising time, which the public broadcasters kept artificially high. See
Humphreys, supra note 33, at 530.
39 See WILFRED ALTMAN, DENIS THOMAS & DAVID SAWERS, TV: FROM MONOPOLY TO
COMPETITION 25-27 (1962).
"40 Id. at 29.
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first commercial television service in Great Britain, called Independent
Television, or ITV. The also created the Independent Television Authority
(ITA), an agency with regulatory power over the ITV network.
4
'
Among its other duties, the ITA was charged with ensuring that British
commercial broadcasting would not mimic its crass, rapidly-developing
American counterpart.42 Critics opposed to commercial broadcasting pointed
to the "vulgar" state of American television as a harbinger of what was to come
in Britain if the government were to end the BBC's monopoly.4a Particularly
criticized was American TV's treatment of Queen Elizabeth I's June 1953
Coronation, where NBC's Today show aired a BBC shortwave radio report on
the Westminster Abbey ceremony, along with still pictures of the Queen,
intermingled with a live in-studio appearance by the show's much-loved
chimpanzee mascot J. Fred Muggs.44 The insertion of commercials during the
aired repeats of the Coronation and car ad copy using terms such as "Queen of
the Road" also drew the UK anti-commercial television lobby's ire.45 On
British television and radio, commercials had to be clearly marked as distinct
from programs,' and a certain portion of content on the network had to be of
British origin.47 All political coverage in which party views were expressed on
the new private channel had to be balanced.41 Strict cross-ownership
restrictions were also put in place, preventing national newspaper proprietors
from owning shares in ITV.
Private broadcasting ownership in Great Britain expanded in fits in the
decades following the 1954 legislation. The 1996 Broadcasting
Act-promulgated to increase consumer choice and to assist British companies
competing internationally-further eased restrictions on broadcast ownership.
The 1996 Act set out an ownership cap for a private entity of no more than a
fifteen percent share of the UK audience.49 The ITA, now called the
41 Television Act, 1954,2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 1(1), available athttp:/O-www.justis.com.gav
el.law.uga.edu/document.aspx?doc-aYmtnlKZnYWYutiXKtnmsnlmsmJaZi5Kdlm&relpos=0.
42 ALTMAN, THOMAS & SAWERS, supra note 39, at 27.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id.
' Television Act, § 4.
41 Id. § 3(l)(d).
48 ASA BRIGGS, THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: VOLUME V:
COMPETITION 243 (1995).
4' Broadcasting Act, 1996, c.55, § 2(l)(a)-(b) sched. 2, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/actsl996/ukpga_19960055_en_1. The BBC enjoyed almost fifty percent of audience share
in the UK at the time of the 1996 Act. See DOYLE, supra note 9, at I10-11. "The effect of
including BBC audiences within the total television market is to almost double the size of that
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Independent Television Commission, was empowered to impose new
conditions on a licensee where it determined that an ownership change could
compromise regional programming or production quality." The 1996 Act also
significantly relaxed the UK's restrictive cross-ownership prohibitions.
Previously, the owner of a newspaper, radio, or TV station group could only
own a minority stake in another medium's ownership group. Now, a single
owner was allowed to own up to fifty percent of the radio sector, but no more
than one national radio license; up to fifteen percent of the television sector, but
no more than one national license; and up to twenty percent of national daily
newspaper circulations.5 While smaller newspaper groups were allowed,
under the new Act, to own interests in broadcasting outlets, the two largest
newspaper groups in the UK-the Mirror Group, owner of the Daily Mirror
and The Independent, among other papers, with a share of about twenty percent
of total UK circulation, and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, owner of
The Sun and the Times papers, with about a forty percent circulation
share-were unable to expand into broadcast television.52
The 1996 Act also included a statutory provision allowing regulators
discretionary power to block media mergers not in the "public interest."" a
Beginning in the early 1990s and culminating shortly after the passage of
the 1996 Act, ITV, the network formerly composed of fourteen separate
regional broadcast licenses established by the 1954 Act, experienced significant
ownership consolidation. Three ownership groups acquired all but the two
smallest license groups in the ITV network. 4
Subsequent proposals in the Communications Act of 2003 supported
continued deregulation in the name of efficiency, investment, and international
competition. 5  The Act established a single agency, the Office of
Communications, or OFCOM, to replace the ITA and several other
communications regulators that had cropped up in the intervening years.56
market and thus to double the audience share a commercial television broadcaster may serve." Id.
50 Broadcasting Act, § 73(3).
1 Broadcasting Act, sched. 2.
52 News Corporation does, however, own approximately one-third of satellite company
BSkyB, the UK's most popular subscription television service and the largest television
company of any sort in Europe. OPEN SOCIETY INSTITuTE, TELEvISION AcRoss EUROPE:
REGULATION, POLICY, AND INDEPENDENCE 136 (2005), available at http://www.eumap.org/top
ics/media/television-europe.
33 DOYLE, supra note 9, at 102.
5 Id. at 48-49.
51 Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, available athttp://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/ukp
ga_20030021_en_1.
56 Communications Act, § 264.
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OFCOM was intended to provide consistency in the regulation of
communications law across several different industry platforms such as radio,
television, telecommunications, and wireless industries.57 As for regulating
private broadcast stations, the 2003 Act preserved the public service
obligations for commercial broadcasters. They were required to provide "a
range of high-quality and diverse programming" that is "properly balanced" in
nature and subject matter, but the Act was clearly competition-friendly; it
subjected broadcasters to a public service assessment every five years, but
revoked the fifteen percent national audience cap set out in the 1996 Act. 5
By far the most controversial provision of the bill introducing the
Communications Act, however, was the further relaxation of cross-ownership
restrictions, which would have allowed newspaper groups controlling more
than twenty percent of the UK market to purchase interests in private broadcast
station Channel 5.59 Consolidation opponents focused their attention, as they
usually do, on Rupert Murdoch and News International, News Corporation's
UK subsidiary; the new legislation would have allowed News International to
bid for Channel 5 shares.6" After significant debate, the House of Lords and the
government agreed to a compromise: a provision subjecting all media mergers
and acquisitions involving transactions of a certain size to a public interest
plurality test. OFCOM would be statutorily required to take the "public voice"
into account when considering mergers in the media market.6 OFCOM's role
in applying the plurality test to ownership mergers, however, would be merely
advisory; the decision as to whether the merger passed the test would be left to
the Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sport, a government cabinet
minister (in this case, the Minister whose department offered the initial
deregulatory bill). 2
57 Id.
58 Id. § 265(3), (4)(c); see also id. § 350 (stating that the restrictions on accumulations of
interest in amended parts of 1990 Act "shall cease to have effect").
59 Id. § 350.
0 The opposition to the proposed legislation's relaxation ofcross-ownership restrictions was
led by Lord Puttnam, a Labour peer in the House of Lords who produced the 1981 Oscar-
winning film"Chariots ofFire." Puttnam Leads Media BillRebels, BBCNEWS (Mar. 26,2003),
'available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/entertainment/tv and radio/288133.stm.
61 Communications Act, § 3(2)(c)-(d); see also id. c. 2, § 378 (amending the Enterprise Act,
legislation enabling the Secretary of State to review certain mergers to ensure they are in the
public interest, and to include a public interest plurality test in review of cross-media mergers).
62 Id. § 384. The potential for conflict was not lost on some members of the House of Lords
during parliamentary debate. See 651 PARtL. DEB., H.L. (5th ses.) (2003) 138, 145-60, available
at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld2002O3/dhansrd/voO3O7O8/text/307
08-07.htm (expressing concern that Lord McNally, the sponsor of the amendment, may be
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The replacement of a national broadcast ownership cap with the public
plurality test casts light upon what seems like a contradiction in OFCOM's
public service remit. Its guiding principle is pro-competition and "light-touch"
regulation;63 on the other hand, it is charged with protecting the public's
interest in a commercial broadcasting service by ensuring a plurality of
ownership. 6' Whether abandoning bright-line consolidation controls, such as
the national audience share cap, for a case-by-case analysis, such as the public
interest plurality test, results in more consolidation in the UK remains to be
seen; the regulator has yet to apply the standard. But OFCOM's cross-industry
jurisdiction, along with a requirement that the Secretary of State consider
whether there is a "sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media
enterprises serving [the relevant] audience" in determining whether a merger
or transaction is in the public interest,65 seems to compel at least one
conclusion: because the goal of the 2003 Act was to establish a comprehensive
and unified communications policy, the agency will likely consider the
presence of the other media outlets within its bailiwick, such as cable,
television, satellite, or the Internet, in determining whether a broadcast media
transaction harms media plurality.
Cable and satellite stations' audience share in the UK has increased more
than sevenfold since 1991, from just four percent to nearly thirty percent
in 2005, so time will likely show that OFCOM's cross-platform approach is the
correct one.' It is already clear, however, that the agency was designed to
subject to a conflict of interest).
63 See OFCOM's Annual Plan, § 1 (2005), available at http://www.ofcom.co.uk/ ("[W]e are
determined that OFCOM's overall approach will be that of a light touch regulator ... ").
64 See, e.g., TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, vol. 3; David H. Goff,
Regulatory Change in the Convergence Era: The Economic Significance of the UK, 13-18
(May 12-15, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cem.ulaval.ca/pdf/goff.
pdf (discussing OFCOM's implementation and state pursuit of media pluralism).
63 Communications Act,§ 375(1)(2A)-(2C) (stating public interest factors the Secretary will
consider in applying plurality test to media mergers). The second part of the three-part test
requires the Secretary to consider "the need for the availability throughout the United Kingdom
of a wide range of broadcasting, which (taken as a whole) is both of high quality and calculated
to appeal to a wide variety of tastes and interests"; this section seems to preclude the
consideration of non-broadcast outlets, but the prong quoted above referring to the "media
landscape" would clearly allow the Secretary to consider nonbroadcast outlets in reviewing
broadcast or cross-media mergers. Indeed, the broadcasting prong of the test seems to invite
consideration of the BBC and the strict public interest obligations placed on commercial
broadcasters as a factor in favor of allowing broadcast and cross-media mergers.
66 See BROADCASTERS' AUDIENCE RESEARCH BOARD LTD., ANNUAL VIEWING
SHARES 1981-2008, available at http://www.barb.co.uk/facts/annualshareofviewing/?fullstory=t
rue&includepage=share&flag=tufacts.
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operate and in many senses is the product of, an interconnected and privatized
media space. A one-broadcast channel state monopoly that served as the
predominant information source for the vast majority of Britons is a relic of a
soon-to-be-unrecognizable past.
III. PRIVATIZATION AND RECONSOLIDATION
A. Media Pluralism Through Privatization
Following the BBC's lead, the public service broadcasting tradition held
fast in Europe for decades. Until the mid-1980s, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
UK were the only states in Europe with private television broadcasters.67 But
across Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, starting in the West and
pushing across the continent to the new democracies in the East, the regulatory
environment at the national level was in a period of liberalization.68 As
Monroe Price points out:
A hallmark, both rhetorical and real, of the global
restructuring process in broadcast has been the effort to shift
67 Indeed, Luxembourg has taken a hands-off approach to media regulation and essentially
has no rules limiting private ownership. Its market is therefore an attractive one to investors, and
media has become a significant sector in its economy. See Alison Harcourt, The European
Commission and the Regulation of the Media Industry, http://www.medialaw.ru/lass/other-laws/
european/e-eh.htm (last visited May 14, 2009).
68 Despite regulatory convergence in Europe under the banner of the EU, media ownership
regulation continues to be a task reserved for national governments. In 1992 and 1994, the
European Commission (EC) issued two Green Papers (a document published by the EC to invite
Europe-wide discussion on a particular issue) on pluralism and media concentration; the EC
stated that "concentration of media access in the hands of a few is by definition a threat to
diversity of information," and sought input on a continental regulatory framework to address
ownership consolidation. See Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market, COM
(1992) 480 (Dec. 12, 1992), available at http://www.cek.ef.uni-lj.si/magister/comicl6l.pdf;
Follow Up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on "Pluralism and Media
Concentration in the Internal Market - An Assessment of the Need for Community Action, "
COM (1994) 353 final (Oct. 5, 1994), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/I 158/01/pluralismgpfollo
w_upCOM_94_353.pdf. The effort to harmonize national media ownership rules throughout
the EU resulted in a 1996 draft directive proposing a thirty percent audience media ownership
cap in the broadcasting market in each member country, and member states were allowed to
exclude public service broadcasters from the caps' limitations. European media companies
lobbied European Commissioners hard against the proposal, however, and attempts to coordinate
media ownership regulation of member countries on the basis of protecting or promoting
pluralism rationale have failed. See ALISON HARCOURT, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
REGULATION OF MEDIA MARKETS 80-112, 115 (2005).
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control over information spaces away from governments ...
[T]he tendency, fairly constant over regions of the world and
even across forms of government, has been toward widely
expanding the role of the private sector.69
In the Netherlands, where the architecture of media regulation was
expressly designed to promote diversity, it was resistance to that architecture,
as manifested by consumer choice and increased privatization, which led to
more content in the media market.7° Pillarization, the organization of a
multicultural society along political and religious lines, affected all aspects of
Dutch life.7' Broadcasting was no exception, and by the mid-1920s, Protestant,
Catholic, and socialist broadcasting associations were sharing time on state-
owned radio networks; members of each group would receive a programming
guide listing their associations' programs.72 The state-owned and operated
television broadcaster, established by statute in 1969, aired general interest
programming for approximately twenty percent of on-air time; the remainder
was divided among pillars according to the size of their respective
memberships.73
In the 1960s, however, while the media system was still segmented,
younger Dutch viewers moved from pillar to pillar. As consumer use fell
outside of the regulatory pillarization framework, it "led to a corresponding de-
pillarisation of the media system, if not in structure at least in ... programme
content. 74 Later, organizations independent of political or religious pillars that
broadcast their signals from beyond Dutch territory fought for and won access
to broadcasting time on Dutch channels,75 and the 1987 Media Act eventually
allowed cable operators to provide their subscribers with foreign programs
subject to strict restrictions on the length and content of advertising.76 In the
Netherlands, private channels led to more choice.
69 MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY 91-92 (2002).
70 Willem F. Korthals Altes, European Law: A Case Study of Changes in National
Broadcasting, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (1993); see also HUMPHREYS, supra note 22,
at 142 (mentioning tradition of pillarization in Dutch society).
71 Pillarizaton has also been termed "sociological federalism." AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE
COUNTRIES 185 (1984).
72 Korthals Altes, supra note 70, at 317. Belgian society was segmented along linguistic
lines in a similar fashion. HUMPHREYS, supra note 22, at 140-41.
73 HUMPHREYS, supra note 22, at 140-41.
74 Id. at 141-42.
7' Korthals Altes, supra note 70, at 318.
76 Media Act, art. 66, 1987 Stb. 249.
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The transitional states in Eastern Europe have followed the modem Western
dual-service model: a public service broadcasting sector, independent from its
state owner, and a private sector, subject to strict public service regulatory
obligations as to content, journalistic ethics, and transparency of ownership."
However, opening the communications market to private owners in the
continent's formerly totalitarian states-where state-owned ownership was
synonymous with state control-was about more than just promoting
competition. In post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the privatization of state-owned
channels was a critical plank in the democratization project. During the midst
ofperestroika in 1990, the Supreme Soviet, the USSR's lawmaking body, and
President Mikhail Gorbachev enacted legislation outlawing media monopoly
and restructuring the governmental agency responsible for program production,
breaking the link in the vertical integration chain between state control and
content development."8 Article 7 of The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Press and Other Means of Mass Information, or Press Law,
declared that the right to establish media outlets belonged to "political parties,
public organizations, mass movements," and any citizen of the USSR over the
age of eighteen, as well as governmental legislative bodies and agencies.79
Later, after the dissolution of the USSR, the media law of formerly
communist countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia allowed some commercial television and advertising on state-owned
channels, but legislation enabling private broadcasting held commercial
stations to strict public service obligations.8° In the Czech Republic, for
example, private stations were required to dedicate at least forty percent of their
77 See generally TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, summary 38.
" Peter Krug, The Abandonment of the State Radio-Television Monopoly in the Soviet
Union: The First Step TowardBroadcasting Pluralism?, 9 WIs. INT'LL.J. 377, 378-79 (1991).
" Zakon oiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o pechati i drugkh sredstvakh
massovoi informatsii, Izvestiia, [Russian Abbrev.] [Press Law], 1990 No. 172, art. 7.
The Russian Press Law is available in English at 42 CURRENT DIG. SoV. PRESS No. 25,
July 25, 1990, at 16-20. See also Krug, supra note 78, at 389. This point should not be read to
imply, however, that Russia's post-socialist transition in the media sphere was any less fraught
than in other areas. President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament engaged in a fierce battle over
who would control the dissemination of information to Russian citizens, and Russian
media reform in the early 1990s almost certainly hurt democratic development more than
helped it. Monroe E. Price, Law, Force, and the Russian Media, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 795,806-20 (1995). I point to the Press Law as only an indicative example of a policy trend
that accepted private ownership of broadcast outlets as a transitional tool in the move from
authoritarianism to democracy.
8o COLIN SPARKS & ANNA READING, COMMuNISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE MASS MEDIA 148
(1998).
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airtime to domestic productions from the start of their second year.8
Hungary's 1997 broadcasting law required an even higher percentage of native-
bred content-a symbolic fifty-one percent.8 2 The mandates for homegrown
productions sought to repair the damage that communist rule had wrought on
the countries' respective national identities.83 Content regulation was therefore
a regulatory tool used to promote and protect the formerly suppressed Czech
and Hungarian cultures."
Media regulation in post-conflict states also created a space for private
broadcasters. Slobodan Milogevid, then president of Serbia, had seized control
of television transmitters in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and broadcast
fictitious reports of Croatian militiamen ruthlessly massacring Serbs.85 These
broadcasts fostered rage among the Serbian people against Croats and Muslims
to support his ethnic cleansing project.86 After the Dayton Accords brought
peace to the region, the United Nations' Office of High Representative, in
charge of administering Bosnia-Herzegovina's 2006 democratic elections,
instituted a comprehensive regulatory regime that included codes of conduct
for program content, ensured equal access for opposition parties, and
established licensing standards.87
The OHR also granted an international media standards commission, the
Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA), the power to set out public
service obligations in commercial broadcasters' licenses, and to sanction
noncompliant stations.8 The CRA, mindful of media abuses in the region's
recent past, has also passed rules prohibiting commercial stations from
broadcasting any material that carries a clear and immediate risk of inciting
ethnic or religious hatred among Bosnia-Herzegovina's diverse communities
of Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs.89 The recently promulgated Rule on Media
"' Id. at 149.
82 Id. at 151.
" Id. at 151-52.
' For a survey of the media's role in newly democratic and pre-democratic countries'
transition to the rule of law, see MEDIA REFORM: DEMOCRATIZING THE MEDIA, DEMOCRATIZING
THE STATE (Monroe E. Price et al., eds. 2002).
85 Monroe E. Price, Bosnia-Hercegovina: Post-Conflict Restructuring, in id. at 93.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 94.
8 See id. at 99-103; Office of the High Representative, Decision Combining the
Competencies of the Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Regulatory
Agency, Official Gazette ofBiH, No. 8/01 (Mar. 2, 2001), available at http://www.ohr.int/print/
?content id=75.
89 Advertising and Sponsorship Code of Practice for Radio and Television, IN 5, 8(c), 10,
14, C.R.A. (Mar. 9, 2000) (BiH).
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Concentration and Cross Ownership has imposed some order on what was
formerly an unregulated free-for-all by preventing multiple broadcast outlet
ownership in a single media market, disallowing any cross-ownership other
than that of a single newspaper and a single broadcast station, and imposing
reporting requirements for ownership transactions of a certain size.90 While
still largely dependent on foreign aid, the dual private/public broadcasting
system in Bosnia-Herzegovina looks to continue beyond the country's status
as a UN protectorate. 91
B. Public and Private Ownership Convergence: Italy
As noted, privatization has played a significant role in breaking down state-
owned broadcast monopolies. In most cases, the result was a diversified media
market and increased consumer choice; in Italy, however, the result was
consolidated media power in a manner never before seen in a post-war,
Western, democratic state.
By the mid-fifties, Italy, like nearly every other Western democracy except
the United States, had an entrenched state-owned television monopoly
dedicated to providing public interest broadcasting. RAI, or Radiotelevisione
Italiana, was a formerly private radio service transferred to government control
that began broadcasting in 1954, and was funded partly through license fees
and partly through carefully circumscribed advertising.92 The familiar rationale
for purely public control was that only such an outlet could guarantee
"independence, objectivity and openness to different political, social and
cultural tendencies and respect for the right of freedom of expression
guaranteed by the [Italian] Constitution."93 While RAI enjoyed its decades-
long broadcast monopoly, Silvio Berlusconi, a businessman who began his
career in real estate in the 1960s, founded Telemilano, a local cable TV station
established to provide television service to an apartment complex he developed
90 CRA RuleNo. 21/2003 (2004); TELEvISIONACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, vol. 1, 318-19.
91 Consistent with the broadcasting structures ofthe international donors themselves, the EU
seems to be providing most of the foreign aid supporting public service broadcasting, such as
the state-owned Radio-Television Republika Srpska, while the United States, mostly through
USAID media programs, supports commercial broadcasting services such as the Mreza Plus
Network. See TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at vol. 1, 265-303.
92 Id. at vol. 2, 880, 922-24.
9 Id. at vol. 2, 896 (quoting [Rai Law] art. 1(2), no. 103, Apr. 14, 1975, Gazz. Uff. no. 102,
Apr. 17, 1975); see also RAI ANNUAL REPORT 2004 at 7 (outlining RAI's public service
obligations), available at http://www.bilancio2004.rai.it/uk/dwl/pdf/RAi2004.pdf (last visited
May 31, 2009).
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on the outskirts of Milan.94 Through Telemilano, which later became Canale 5,
Berlusconi began mounting a challenge to RAI's dominance.95
The public broadcaster's nationwide monopoly was undisputed on pluralism
grounds; however, a series of Italian Constitutional Court decisions in the
late 1970s and early 1980s found that private television stations broadcasting
locally did not interfere with RAI's monopoly and their operations were
therefore legal.96 Berlusconi, armed with the decisions, bought programs,
especially U.S. movies and soap operas, and aired them simultaneously over
the local stations he was purchasing throughout the country or offered them at
cut-rate prices to small regional television stations.97 He also inserted pre-
recorded advertising into the programs and reinvested the revenue from its sale
into purchasing more local stations.98 Local Canale 5 stations throughout Italy
agreed to broadcast the same programs at the same time, granting Berlusconi
a national audience and, by extension, a de facto national network."
In the mid-1980s, Berlusconi, flush with advertising profits, bought his two
rivals in the private broadcasting industry, Italia 1 and Rete 4, holding them
through his media company Fininvest.'0° After several local magistrates in
Turin, Rome, and Pescara shut down his stations for broadcasting nationally in
violation of RAI's monopoly, he tapped political clout with his close friend and
then-Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to win a decree allowing his stations to
remain on the air.101 Six months later the decree became law, and in
August 1990 a new media bill was passed, allowing private ownership of
national networks but placing an ownership cap of three networks by any one
owner.' 2 While technically twelve broadcast stations were available at the
time on Italian televisions, the three most-watched channels other than Italia 1,
Rete 4, and Canale 5 were all run by RAI, and the rest had a combined
94 PAUL GINSBORG, SILvio BERLUSCONI: TELEVISION, POWER AND PATRIMONY 30 (2004).
95 Id.
96 Racc. uff. corte cost., 28 July 1976, n.202; see also GINSBORG, supra note 94, at 37-40.
97 GINSBORG, supra note 94, at 37-40; An Italian Story, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2001.
98 An Italian Story, supra note 97.
99 Id
100 Id.
10' See Law Converting Into Law "Law Decree 807" of 6 December 1984 on Urgent
Dispositions in the Area of Television Broadcasting, no. 10 (Feb. 4, 1985), Gazz. Uff. no. 30
(Feb. 5, 1985); GINSBORG, supra note 94, at 38. Those Berlusconi stations still on the air also
rallied to the privatization cause; in response to the blackout they called for a recognition of the
television viewer's right to "use the television's automatic controls," or to libertii di
telecomando. GINSBORG, supra note 94, at 38.
'02 Gianluca Gardini, The Legal Regulation of Electoral Broadcasting in Italy, http://www.
jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Constitutional/Gardini 1.html (last visited May 14, 2009).
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audience share of less than nine percent.'13 Berlusconi's holdings were
legitimized post hoc by the Italian media law, and the three commercial
television stations he owned grew to represent up to forty-five percent of the
Italian viewing audience-an amount equal to that of RAI's three channels."
Commentators have argued that Berlusconi used control over his media
holdings to help him secure the premiership of Italy in 1994 and 2001.1"5
Analysis of the 1994 election results shows that there was more of a swing to
the right among Berlusconi-channel viewers than among the Italian electorate
at large.' 6° Berlusconi's coalition government fell apart in 1996, forcing him
to resign from office, only to run again five years later. The use of his TV
networks for political advantage leading up to the latter election was even more
pronounced; during the 2001 campaign for Prime Minister, Berlusconi's
stations gave him almost two times the coverage of his center-left rival
Francesco Ruteli (RAI, by contrast, gave roughly equal time to the two
candidates on its three stations)."0 7 In the two years preceding the official
campaign, the difference was even more striking, with Berlusconi appearing on
television more than four times as often as his opponent.' 8 During the pre-
election period in 2001, Italy's Communications Authority censured Rete 4 for
violating its rules on political impartiality.'
Once in office, Berlusconi wasted little time in seeking to exercise his
influence over RAI. He characterized critics of his policies appearing on RAI
programs as putting public television to "criminal use.""'  After his
accusations, RAI management took the two highly-rated programs that hosted
those critics, l1 Fatto and Sciusciti, off the air.1" The latter show was replaced
by a program hosted by a journalist widely perceived as sympathetic to the
1"3 TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at vol. 2, 925.
14 HUMPHREYS, supra note 22, at 179-80.
105 DOYLE, supra note 9, at 20; HUMPHREYS, supra note 22, at 209.
106 DOYLE, supra note 9, at 20 (citing A. GRAHAM AND G. DAVIES, BROADCASTING, SOCIETY
AND POLICY IN THE MULTIMEDIA AGE 32 (1997)).
107 DAL'ULIvo AL GovERNo BERLUSCONI, (G. Pasquino ed., il Mulino, 2002), cited in
Raffaele Mastrolonardo, Media Concentration: The Italian Case-Study, OPEN DEMOCRACY 1,
Mar. 14, 2002, http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-globalmediaownership/article54.jsp.
10 MASS MEDIA ED ELEZONI (G. Sani ed., il Mulino, 2001), cited in Mastrolonardo, supra
note 107.
'09 p. Betts, The Medium Is the Message as Italian Poll Is Glued to TV: The Control of
Television Is Fundamental to the Election Debate, FIN. TIMEs, May 5, 2001, at 6.
10 Soria Blatman, A Media Conflict of Interest: Anomaly in Italy, REP. WITHOUT BORDERS
(Reporters Sans Fronti&es, Fr.), Apr. 2003, at 11, available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/doc-
2080.pdf.
.. Id. at 12.
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right-wing coalition government; it proved to be a ratings failure."2 During the
controversy over the cancelled programs, Luigi Zanda and Carmine Donzelli,
opposing members of RAI's board, resigned in protest."3 Berlusconi also
sought to broaden his media holdings once in office; his supporters on the
Italian right proposed a media law passed by the Italian Parliament in 2003 that
would have significantly relaxed restrictions on cross-ownership, allowing
Fininvest's broadcasting arm Mediaset to acquire radio and newspaper
outlets."' President Carlo Azeglio has implicitly rejected the legislation.
Berlusconi's interests extended through the print media as well, but his
newspaper holdings were a far less effective tool in attempting to corral public
opinion in his favor. He was a forty-eight percent shareholder in the
Mondadori publishing group, which itself owned thirty-one percent of the
publishing industry, including Panorama, one of the country's biggest news
weekly magazines." 5 His wife and brother also ran two large daily Italian
newspapers, II Foglio and II Giornale, respectively;" 6 cross-ownership
restrictions passed in 1990 compelled his divestiture of the latter paper.' 
17
Despite the reach and influence of the Berlusconi empire in the print medium,
the Italian paper press offers a range of diverse viewpoints due to a tradition of
editorial autonomy, a multitude of titles, and entrenched partisan political
identities of individual papers." 8 Berlusconi endured significant criticism in
print during his tenure. For example, even II Corriere della Sera, Italy's
largest daily newspaper, owned by a group and run by well-known
conservative industrialist Cesare Romiti has opposed the government on
several occasions on issues such as Berlusconi's control over RAI and Italy's
support of U.S. policy in the Middle East." 9
The environment that allowed Berlusconi's convergence of broadcasting
power was unique in many ways. One might argue that the Italian Parliament
was simply not up to the task of amending media law, post hoc, in any
meaningful way once Berlusconi had already amassed his broadcast holdings
112 Id
"3 Id. at 10.
114 Id. at 5.
11 Id. at 3.
116 Id.
117 TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at vol. 2, 913.
1.. Blatman, supra note 110, at 6.
119 Id. at 4. Despite its historical editorial independence, the printed press's reach is less than
that of broadcasters'; in 1999, eighty-two percent of Italians reported getting the majority of their
news from television--the highest such number in Europe. PIPPA NORRIS, A VIRTUOUS
CIRCLE 80 (2000).
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and had turned their use to his political advantage. Parliament made no effort
to put regulations in place governing media acquisitions; it proposed no rules
requiring government approval for consolidating transactions or mergers.120
Parliament effectively remained inactive in the media policy area despite
continued admonitions from the constitutional court, which provided both
constitutional underpinnings and specific recommendations to promote and
protect pluralism in the broadcast market. '2 Attempts to amend the media law
after Berlusconi entered office also gave superficial shrift to the issue. A law
passed by the Parliament in February 2002, ostensibly to resolve Berlusconi's
conflicts of interest, barred elected officials from managing a private company
or holding an honorary position such as a chairmanship. The law, however, did
not bar controlling ownership in private companies. Berlusconi therefore had
to relinquish his honorary chairmanship in his AC Milan soccer club but was
not required to divest himself of his controlling ownership interests in
Fininvest. 22
Berlusconi narrowly lost his bid for re-election in April 2006 and was then
re-elected two years later; given the print press's active criticism of him as both
Prime Minister and candidate, one could conclude that the people's will
eventually works its way through the obstructing influence of media
consolidation the way running water eventually finds the cracks in a dam. But
for a time, the Italian Parliament was at least complicit, if not a direct
accomplice, in his accumulation of power over Italian television. Perhaps the
Berlusconi example cuts both ways; since government is inherently susceptible
to such influence, can it ever be fully entrusted to guard the electorate against
the perceived distortions caused by an overconsolidated media space?'23 (In
120 See TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at vol. 2, 913-14 (explaining that media
regulations in 1990s Italy proved largely ineffective).
121 See id. at vol. 2, 915 (stating lawmakers have "the obligation to prevent the formation of
dominant positions and to promote access to the broadcasting sector of the highest possible
number of different opinions, so the public could be in a position to make its decisions having
in mind different standpoints and alternative cultural forms of expression" (quoting Racc. uff.
corte cost., 26 Mar. 1993, n. 112, 14 Gazz. Uff. 1993)).
122 See In Italy's Interests, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4,2002, at 20 (asserting that the new law is a "fig
leaf" and changes nothing).
123 Nor is our political class here at home immune to the self-preservation instinct when
exercising its regulatory muscle over the media. As President Nixon noted in the heat of
Watergate coverage, "[t]he main, main thing is The [Washington] Post is going to have
damnable, damnable problems out of this one. They have a television station.... and they're
going to have to get it renewed." S. REP. No. 93-981, at 149 (1974). Senator Ted Kennedy
successfully slipped legislation into a large, unrelated budget bill that eliminated the FCC's
temporary waiver of the cross-ownership rule allowing Rupert Murdoch to own both the Boston
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addition, does the prospective electorate feel the need to be so protected? 124)
Imagine if, instead of twelve nationally licensed private broadcast stations, of
which Berlusconi owned three during his rise to power, there were thirty or
forty. Or consider whether his holdings could have influenced public opinion
in the run-up to his first election to the same degree as in the present-day
United States, where the cable, satellite, and Internet options for seeking out
and finding alternative viewpoints are nearly immeasurable. Increasing media
choices, rather than trying to disincentivize the acquisition of existing media
properties, might be a more efficient fix for diffusing media consolidation's
perceived potential to distort public opinion.
IV. ANALYSIS
If ownership consolidation is truly a problem, the prescription is simple: do
not let media owners exert editorial control over their outlets. A regime
mandating distinct separation between ownership and management would
dislodge the ownership presumption and obviate the need for consolidation
controls. 125  Where ownership and control over content are unlinked, the
dangers of a consolidated media market disappear and firms can enjoy the
efficiencies of mergers. Private investment and the development of economies
of scale could continue unabated. Large media firms would invest in new
outlets, and consumer choice would effectuate pluralism of content.
However, as the Italian example shows, there is more than one kind of
control. An owner's influence extends well beyond content-based decisions to
include personnel and investment choices, among other indirect
controls-decisions that can affect content to almost the same degree as an
owner telling his station group what to air.'26
Herald and a Boston television station; the conservative Herald's coverage of Senator Kennedy
was less than favorable. Allan R. Gold, Kennedy and Paper Battle in Boston, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 7, 1988, at A16; Laurence Zuckerman, "Fat Boy" v. the "Dirty Digger," TIME,
Jan. 19, 1988, at 19.
124 In a recent global survey, Italians reported the highest levels of dissatisfaction with their
government of any Western country. Richard Wike, Italy's Malaise: La Vita Non E Cosi Dolce,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Jan. 17, 2008, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/695/italys-
malaise-la-vita-non-e-cosi-dolce. So in one sense, perhaps Italians have already made up their
minds about their politicians.
121 See 2002 Media Ownership Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (describing the
"ownership presumption," under which ownership of an outlet is presumed to influence the
viewpoints expressed therein).
26 See DOYLE, supra note 9, at 19 (stating that "[a]n owner's influence may manifest itself
in the choice of key personnel, or in strategic decisions about which resources to reduce or invest
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On the other hand, lest we forget, owners have rights too. 127 It would be
absurd to call for a regulatory scheme that would bar the owner of a newspaper
from expressing his views in that paper; the notion does violence to our
collective memory of the Founding Era's archetypical sole pamphleteer. Some
control is inherent in ownership, whether of a television station or of a comer
store.
So what are we to do? The rest of this Part assesses the regulatory
approaches countries most often use and considers the strengths and
weaknesses of each method. The approaches can roughly be broken down into
two types: (1) structural limitations on private ownership that bar a certain
owner from owning combinations of a certain kind or amount, and (2)
development of alternatives to alleviate some of the perceived problems caused
by private ownership. However, neither of these approaches adequately
addresses what its proponents view as the harms associated with ownership
consolidation because such proponents can demonstrate neither those harms
nor the approaches' salutary effects upon them. In addition to an effectiveness
problem, media ownership regulation in the United States raises a
constitutional question. Because the government justifies its ownership
preferences by citing a concern over what some (disfavored) potential owners
might say, such a preference could well be interpreted by the Supreme Court
as a content-based regulation and declared suspect, if not invalid. Given these
concerns, I propose an alternative method of curbing the potential of excessive
media ownership influence: self-regulation through private contract.
A. The Problem with Ownership Limitations
In terms of direct rules affecting television station transactions, if there is
an internationally predominant regulatory trend, it is the use of a national
audience cap as a limit on the holdings of any private owner. The amount of
the cap is somewhat consistent, except for a few outliers: the figure in the
United States is thirty-nine percent; Germany's cap is set at thirty percent; the
more in, or in arrangements for sourcing or distributing content").
"27 The United States Supreme Court and FCC have recognized as much. See Miami Herald
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); 2002 Media Ownership Order, 352 ("[I]t is hardly surprising,
nor do we find it troubling, that newspaper owners use their media properties to express or
advocate a viewpoint. To the contrary, since the beginning of the Republic, media outlets have
been used by their owners to give voice to, among others, opinions unpopular or revolutionary,
to advocate particular positions, or to defend, sometimes stridently, social or governmental
institutions. Our broadcast ownership rules may not and should not discourage such activity....
The media are not common carriers of speech." (footnotes omitted)).
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cap used in the United Kingdom until recently was set at thirty percent of the
commercial television audience. 2' A national audience cap as compared to
some other method of limitation can work in the interest of the broadcast owner
seeking to expand into other, newer segments of the media market. Germany
had an ownership cap that was similar to Italy's, based on the total number of
channels any single entity could own, but during comprehensive reform of its
ownership regulation in 1996 and in response to complaints from broadcasters
who wanted to expand into cable, Germany switched to a cap based on national
audience share.'29 Even countries with significantly concentrated ownership,
such as Australia, adhere to a national audience size limitation. 31
One criticism leveled against an ownership limitation based on the size of
the audience one particular broadcaster reaches is that it is arbitrary regulatory
line-drawing at its worst. An audience limit of thirty percent is no easier to
justify than a limit of thirty-five percent or forty percent; informed by the
ownership presumption, we "know" only that more consolidation is bad. But
the U.S. example shows that, at least in the public's collective psyche, there
may be a tipping point. When the FCC sought in 2003 to raise the national
ownership cap to forty-five percent,1' some members of the electorate
revolted, and groups and constituents across the political spectrum filed more
than two million comments to the agency expressing their dissatisfaction.
Congress eventually intervened, statutorily setting the cap at thirty-nine
percent.
One might reasonably ask why forty-five percent, or even forty percent, is
too high while thirty-nine percent is acceptable. One answer seems to be that
some members of the U.S. public and their representatives had a psychosomatic
reaction to a cap number that was within spitting distance of allowing a single
owner to reach half the national television audience. 32 The difference between
128 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (2008); Josef Trappel & Werner A. Meier, Media
Concentration: Options for Policy, in MEDIA POL1CY: CONVERGENCE, CONCENTRATION, AND
COMMERCE 191, 193 (Denis McQuail & Karen Siune, eds. 1998). Failed efforts to harmonize
ownership concentration regulation across the EU also utilized a thirty percent national audience
ownership cap for member countries. See supra note 67.
129 TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at vol. 2, 762. Germany's national audience
cap has a cross-ownership component as well; any company with a dominant presence in another
media sector such as print or radio is subject to a reduced national audience cap of twenty-five
percent. Id. at 763.
'30 See Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, § 53(1) (Austl.) ("A person must not be in a position
to exercise control of commercial television broadcasting licenses whose combined license area
populations exceed [seventy-five percent] of the population of Australia.").
"' 2002 Media Ownership Order, 539.
132 To be fair, there was a practical reason Congress arrived at the thirty-nine percent figure;
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an administrative line and a legislative line, however, is not where the line is
drawn, but the hand behind the pencil: as to the U.S. national cap, the line was
drawn not by appointed regulators but by elected representatives. That
distinction alone may make the result less arbitrary. But it does not satisfy
anyone who seeks an adequate justification for government to regulate media
ownership more, less, or at all.
One might also ask what it means that some countries' caps are higher than
others', or that a country might adopt or decrease an ownership cap. Australia,
one of the outliers referred to earlier, has a seventy-five percent cap; 133 does
this mean that the results in U.S. elections are more reliably based on informed
voter decisions rather than on distorted media influence? Does the answer to
that question change if Australians watch less television than Americans do, or
if Americans visit more political blogs or watch more debates? Canada's
media regulator, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission, has recently announced a forty-five percent national audience
cap, as well as cross-media limits in local markets. 34 Does this mean that
Canadians can be better assured that their election results will more accurately
reflect the considered collective will? To ask these questions is to answer
them; dispersal of ownership to promote viewpoint diversity may be a
worthwhile policy goal, but the conclusion is more intuitive than empirical.
Another approach is to vest discretionary power in an independent agency
to consider media mergers on a case-by-case basis. In Ireland, for example,
there are no formal rules regarding cross-ownership or consolidation of
ownership of either press or broadcast outlets, but the broadcast licensing
authority of Ireland is statutorily required to consider diversity concerns in the
issuance of licenses. 35 But a case-by-case approach presents problems as well.
it was the amount of audience share enjoyed by the two largest U.S. broadcasters, News Corp.
(owner of Fox) and Viacom (owner ofCBS). Id. 555. Congress evidently determined that the
biggest broadcasters were big enough and chose a cap that would avoid requiring News Corp.
and Viacom to divest themselves of any television stations, but would prevent them from getting
any bigger. So to be precise, legislators believed that the biggest broadcast television companies
were big enough. This was apparently the path of least resistance, since it required neither
company to divest of any stations to comply with the new cap.
133 Broadcasting Services Act, § 53(1).
"' See Daina Lawrence, Canada's New Media Rules Attacked, FIN. TIMES (Can.),
Jan. 16, 2008.
"3 Radio and Television Act (1988), § 6(2)(g)-(h), available at http://www.irishstatuteboo
k.ie/1988/en/act/pub/0020/index.html.
In the consideration of applications received by it and in determining the most
suitable applicant to be awarded a sound broadcasting contract, the
Commission shall have regard to-
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The lack of regulatory stability, as well as the prospect of administrative
rigmarole, may drive prospective station buyers out of the market. Case-by-
case analyses also make the regulator-appointment process critical, as the
approval of a merger and interpretation of statutory concerns rests entirely
within the discretion of the sitting regulators; a change in the Commission's
majority could result in either a flood or a trickle of prospective station
purchases, depending on the direction of the agency's political tip.
The more serious flaws with both the national cap and a case-by-case
approach lie in the practice of regulating ownership through licensing.
Consider the following hypothetical: the owner of the largest audience market
share in Country X decides to run an editorial, simultaneously on all of his
stations during their evening news broadcasts, demanding the abolition of the
national ownership cap, arguing it violates core freedom of expression
principles, and encouraging viewers to contact their representative and the
relevant regulator to urge them to advocate this abolition. Next, crank up the
owner's consolidation power to maximum effect, and assume that every single
television in his stations' viewing areas was tuned to those evening news
programs. (If you prefer your media barons nefarious, make it a news story
about the ineffectiveness of the cap, instead of an editorial.) Even so, we
simply do not know how many viewers were watching intently enough to be
(g) the desirability of allowing any person, or group of persons, to have
control of, or substantial interests in, an undue number of sound
broadcasting services in respect of which a sound broadcasting contract
has been awarded under this Act;
(h) the desirability of allowing any person, or group of persons, to have
control of, or substantial interests in, an undue amount of the
communications media.
See also Broadcasting Act, 2001 § 11 (2), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/home.html
(search "Broadcasting Act 2001").
[T]he Commission shall endeavour to ensure that the number and categories
of broadcasting services made available in the State by virtue of this Act or
the Act of 1988 best serve the needs of the people of the island of Ireland,
bearing in mind their languages and traditions and their religious, ethical and
cultural diversity.
Id. Christina Holtz-Bacha & Pippa Norris," 'To entertain, inform and education': Still the Role
of Public Television in the 1990s?", available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-pnorris/Acrobat/
CHRISTIN.pdf ("[T]hose who regularly watch public television news provided the most
informed out of all European groups [and] in contrast those who watched commercial TV
entertainment proved the least informed.") (last visited May 14, 2009); see also William Dinan,
The Republic of Ireland's Media Space: Ownership, Regulation, and Policy, STIRLING MEDIA
RESEARCH INsTIru 3 (2001), available at http://www.cem.ulaval.ca/CONCirlande.pdf
(discussing the functions of the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC)).
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influenced, how many listened but had already decided that ownership caps
were a good thing and were therefore not persuaded, or how many were fixing
dinner, feeding the baby, or reading the evening paper and not paying attention.
There is no way, in other words, to measure the intensity of consumption of the
media product, let alone its direct effects. Unlike lead in toothpaste or mercury
in drinking water, the symptoms associated with consuming consolidated
media are difficult to measure and nearly impossible to define.
So in a real sense, media anticonsolidation measures regulate against
potential influence, rather than exercised influence.136 But as the Berlusconi
example shows (admittedly in the extreme), where the existence of
concentration power is a predicate to its abuse, it may be a worthwhile societal
goal to prevent the predicate. As Edwin Baker argues, "although this power [of
unchecked concentration] may seldom or never be exercised, no democracy
should risk the danger."' However, even assuming such a potential danger
exists does not necessarily mean the government should aggressively regulate
to preclude such potentiality, especially when its power to do so may be
constitutionally suspect.
B. A Constitutional Concern
Even some deregulation advocates have presumed (sometimes for the sake
of argument; sometimes because they had another regulation more clearly
identifiable as content-based, such as affirmative programming requirements,
in their sights) that ownership regulation would undergo rational basis review
if subjected to First Amendment challenge. 3 ' But by its own admission, the
reason government regulates ownership is to ensure that broadcast content is
sufficiently diverse-the presumption is that two different owners will result
in different, more desirable programming content across both stations than
136 Commentators have noted other problems with the ownership presumption: that whether
it works is empirically unproven, see Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on
Content: Does it Matter?, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755, 763 (1994) ("There is no
evidence that any of [the FCC's] policies on ownership has in fact resulted in greater (or less)
diversity of content."), or worse, that the FCC has recognized this infirmity but continues to rely
on it, see Adam Candeub, The FirstAmendment and Measuring Media Diversity: Constitutional
Principles andRegulatory Challenges, 33 N. KY. L. REv. 373,375 (2005) (stating that the FCC
"simply equates viewpoint diversity to diversity of ownership almost as a matter of religious
faith-without empirical backing").
137 C. Edwin Baker, Commentary: Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First
Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 735 (2004).
138 See THoMAs G. KRATrENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 226-27 (1994).
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would occur if those stations were jointly owned. The government has
expressed a preference for diverse speech over the speech that an unregulated
media market would cause, and for one owner over another. As Jonathan
Emord notes:
[T]he entire system of ownership regulations proceeds from the
Commission's unsubstantiated presumption of a close nexus
between the identity of the broadcaster and the viewpoints
expressed by that broadcaster through his choice of
programming. . . . [By using ownership regulation to create
viewpoint diversity, the FCC is] presuming that each new
broadcast media owner will add a different voice to the
marketplace of ideas.'39
The critical inquiry is whether a government preference for diverse content
is a content-based justification requiring the regulations enacted in pursuit of
the preference to be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny. Moreover, if it
turns out the FCC is right and there is a "close nexus" between owner and
viewpoint of the kind Emord describes, the argument that ownership regulation
is content-based is arguably even stronger. Therefore, the more empirical
support the Commission provides for the presumption, the more
constitutionally suspect it becomes.
Proponents of regulation who take the constitutionality of ownership
restrictions as a given make two intertwined claims: that structural regulations
do not express a viewpoint preference, and are therefore not content-based, and
that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce public good, which entitles government
to impose greater conditions upon the entities that use it. Unpacking the two
justifications reveals the problems inherent in each.
1. Structural Regulations as Inherently Content-Neutral?
The Supreme Court's most recent foray into analyzing the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to structural media regulation was
in the 1994 case Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), where
the Court held in a 5-4 opinion that the so-called "must-carry" provisions of
' Jonathan Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 433, 436 (1988); see also R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959) (arguing that the allocation of broadcasting signals is
an economic matter best left to private enterprise).
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the 1992 Cable Act, which required cable operators to carry the local broadcast
stations in their markets, were content-neutral regulation and therefore subject
to only intermediate scrutiny."4 The government does not engage in content-
based regulation, the majority found in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,
so long as its measures "are not a subtle means of exercising a content
preference" or "enacted to promote speech of a favored content."'' The
government's intent was not content-motivated, in other words, and the must-
carry rules "on their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference
to the content of speech"; they were therefore content-neutral. 4 2 Congress's
"overriding objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of
a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access
to free television.'
143
The Court's conclusion in Turner I begs the question why the government
thought access to free programming should be preserved. The obvious answer?
Its content. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in dissent, the must-carry rules
were analogous to a government mandate "order[ing] all movie theaters to
reserve at least one-third of their screening for films made by American
production companies, or required all bookstores to devote one-third of their
shelf space to nonprofit publishers."' 44  The rules at issue expressed a
preference for local broadcast programming over that which a cable
programmer would have otherwise provided, like the dissent's hypothetical
regulations expressed a preference for American films over French cingma or
charitable books over get-rich-quick guides, and that preference was justified
140 512 U.S. 622 (1994). The right to provide the programming of one's choice has long been
treated by the Court as First Amendment-protected speech. See Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) ("Through original programming or by
exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include," cable programmers
"seek[ ] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats");
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
141 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 643.
141 Id. at 645.
143 Id. at 647. Lower courts have followed Turner I majority's holding in finding the
Commission efforts to regulate broadcasting on diversity and localism grounds to be content-
neutral. See, e.g., Am. Family Ass'n v. FCC, 365 F.3d 1156, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 634 (2004); Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1041-42 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372,401-02 (3d Cir. 2004).
'4 TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor concurred only in those parts of the majority opinion holding that cable operators'
programming decisions enjoyed full First Amendment protection. Joining her in dissent were
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg; joining Justice Kennedy's majority opinion were Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.
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"with reference to content."'' 45 As Congress' Cable Act findings stated, "[t]here
is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a
diversity of views provided through multiple technology media," "[p]ublic
television provides educational and informational programming to the Nation's
citizens, thereby advancing the Government's compelling interest in educating
its citizens," and "[b]roadcast television stations continue to be an important
source of local news and public affairs programming and other local broadcast
services critical to an informed electorate."' 46 Congress was therefore clearly
expressing a preference, the dissent concluded, and expressly referred to a
favored kind of content in making its preference known. 147
The must-carry rules may have been structural in nature, but they clearly
evince a content-based intent: to ensure a space for local content on the
televisions of cable subscribers. They also certainly communicate a content-
based preference for the kind of programming a local broadcasting licensee
would be likely to provide over that which a cable programmer or operator
would offer on those same channels. Their overriding objective was to
promote and preserve local content by ensuring the survival of local
broadcasting. In operation, they precluded a cable operator's right to air the
content of its choice, a First Amendment interest that all nine members of the
Court recognized. Therefore, the conclusion that they were content-based, and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny, should have followed.1 48
' Id. Indeed, the Commission has justified ownership regulations with similarly explicit
references. See 2002 Media Ownership Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 30 (Aug. 5, 2003)
("[E]vidence from a variety of researchers and organizations appears to disclose a meaningful
connection between the identity of the outlet owner and the content delivered via its outlet(s).
This evidence provides an additional basis to reaffirm our longstanding conclusion that
regulating ownership is an appropriate means to promote viewpoint diversity.").
146 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 676-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting the Cable Act § 2).
147 Id. at 677-78.
14' The majority conceded that Congress's findings recognized the value of local
programming, but found this value judgment did not express a content preference:
[I]n the course of describing the purposes behind the Act, Congress referred
to the value of broadcast programming .... We do not think, however, that
such references cast any material doubt on the content-neutral character of
must-carry. That Congress acknowledged the local orientation of broadcast
programming and the role that noncommercial stations have played in
educating the public does not indicate that Congress regarded broadcast
programming as more valuable than cable programming. Rather, it reflects
nothing more than the recognition that the services provided by broadcast
television have some intrinsic value[,] and[ I thus, are worth preserving
against the threats posed by cable.
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Turner I illustrates that distinguishing regulations on the basis of whether
they are structural or facially content-neutral is a formalistic fiction. The
Court's content-based and content-neutral jurisprudence has focused on
whether the challenged law or regulation at issue evinced a governmental intent
to favor or disfavor a given message or speaker for which it had a preference,
regardless of whether the law or regulation was facially content-neutral or
structural in nature. 149  Likewise, a hypothetical regulation requiring that
twenty-five percent of all broadcast licensees be located in their community of
license could be characterized as a structural regulation, but it clearly expresses
a content-based intent on the part of the government-to place more local
programming on the air-as well as a content-based preference for the kind of
programming a local, as opposed to an absentee, licensee would provide.
Similarly, any regulation of broadcast ownership relying on the principle of
viewpoint diversity, whether structural in nature or not, could fairly be
characterized as content-based. As Justice O'Connor's Turner I dissent noted,
"[t]he interest in ensuring access to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic
sources of information, no matter how praiseworthy, is directly tied to the
content of what the speakers will likely say."' 5° That analytical principle
applies with equal force to ownership regulation because the rationale for
limiting ownership is an explicit governmental preference for diverse content
over whatever content a consolidated market would produce, as well as for the
kind of owner that the government presumes will provide that preferred
content.
The examples offered by Justice O'Connor in Turner I, discussed above,
illustrate the fallacy of the distinction between structural- and content-based
regulations. Similarly, one could imagine a law requiring intemet service
providers to provide access to a minimum number of different websites on their
portal pages; or a planning department that refused a construction permit to a
DVD store owner unless he agreed to carry educational films; or a local
Id. at 648 (majority opinion). The majority cited no authority for the proposition that in order
to be content-based, the government must express a preference for the speech benefiting from
the regulation over the speech being burdened. Nor did it explain why Congress's recognition
that local broadcast content has "intrinsic value" would be different than a recognition that it was
"more valuable" than cable programming. The content-based/content-neutral determination
cannot turn on the distinction between "valuable" and "more valuable."
149 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-79 (1968) (upholding a statute
criminalizing the burning of Selective Service cards because of a non-speech-related government
interest in efficient functioning of draft system); see also, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (Flag Protection Act expressed no content-based limitation but was
intended to curtail freedom of expression and was therefore unconstitutional).
ISo Turner I, 512 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ordinance that precluded the same proprietor from owning more than one
bookstore in a particular town. One could even imagine, as Ronald Coase
postulated, a "commission appointed by the federal government [which] had
the task of selecting those who were to be allowed to publish newspapers and
periodicals in each city, town, and village in the United States."'' All of these
limitations can be fairly characterized as structural regulation. Arguably, none
express a particular viewpoint preference with specificity. All, however, would
be at least suspect under, if not flatly inconsistent with, the First Amendment,
and subjected to strict scrutiny. Determining whether a regulation is structural
in nature does not answer the question of whether it is content-based; rather,
it raises it.'52
The foreign regulatory systems discussed above support the same
conclusion. Take the BBC. Its establishment, and the coextensive bar on
private broadcast ownership, was purely structural, yet rooted in the notion that
broadcasting's capacity to deliver content was too important a power to leave
to the market. Therefore, the British government, guided not by profit but by
an interest in providing quality, state-building, self-improving content to the
viewing public, decided to retain the authority to own and air content by
itself' 53 The speaker was favored because of the content it was likely to
provide. Similarly, a Dutch pillar was designed to ensure that a given segment
of Dutch society would receive programming that was responsive to their
needs, experiences, and concerns. 54 Even the Italian example is illustrative,
in that it shows what can happen when no limitations are placed on ownership
by government, competition, or private actors themselves: a consolidation of
1 Coase, supra note 139, at 7.
5 A red herring lurks in the Turner I analogy; one should not pursue it. In Turner 1, the
government action (the must-carry rules) forced the speaker (the cable operator) to speak against
his will (carry a local station on the cable system over one of his choice). By contrast, there is
no constitutional right to own a television station. Following the herring's scent, one might
conclude that unlike in Turner I, no speech right is implicated by the denial of a license to an
otherwise qualified entity on the grounds that the ownership rules forbid it. But the relevant
constitutional event for constitutional purposes is not the denial itself, but the justification given
for it. No one would argue that a buyer who was denied a broadcast license "upon the basis of
their political, economic or social views," NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943),
would have a viable First Amendment claim. On the other hand, a buyer who was denied a
license because he had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude would not.
"I When Lord Reith was asked whether the BBC was going to give the viewing public what
they wanted, he famously replied, "No. Something better than that." See Vanessa Thorpe, BBC
Under Fire for Teen Bias After DJ is Axed, GUARDLAN (UK), May 28, 2000, at 3, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2000/may/28/bbc.uknews (reporting on public outcry after
dismissal of popular host).
'5 HumPHREYs, supra note 22, at 140-41.
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content control in the hands of a single owner. Clearly the reason to regulate
ownership is not simply, or even primarily, to exercise control over who can
speak, but to influence the kind of programming aired. As the D.C. Circuit
once noted, any content-based definition of diversity "may well give rise to
enormous tensions with the First Amendment";'.. a reviewing Supreme Court
might find that in regulating in pursuit of viewpoint diversity, the FCC is, by
definition, engaging in a content-based exercise.
Arguments that ownership regulations are consistent with the First
Amendment by courts and commentators alike rely on FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB), where the Supreme Court found
that the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule was a "reasonable means
of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications."' 5 6 But
the case is unreliable authority. First, the 1978 decision, authored by Justice
Marshall, found that the rule was reasonably related to the Commission's goal
of serving the public interest by "promoting diversity of program and service
viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic
power." '57 It grounded the FCC's regulatory authority over media ownership,
however, in the physical scarcity of the broadcast spectrum -a rationale that
courts have found increasingly more difficult to justify, as will be shown
below. Second, NCCB, following Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,159 found
the First Amendment interests of the television audience, rather than the First
Amendment rights of the speaker, paramount-a mode of analysis that the
Court has turned away from in recent speech cases, with good reason (after all,
the Amendment expressly protects the right to speak, not to receive speech). 60
155 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
156 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978).
117 Id. at 780.
158 Id. at 795, 799. The Court upheld the rule on procedural review "notwithstanding the
inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record" on the harms of cross-ownership, and even though
"evidence of specific abuses by common owners is difficult to compile." Id. at 796-97.
159 395 U.S. 367 (1969). RedLion and its vulnerable legacy are discussed more fully at Part
IV.B.2.
"6 Compare RedLion, 395 U.S. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."), andNCCB, 436 U.S. at 800 ("Requiring those
who wish to obtain a broadcast license to demonstrate that such would serve the 'public interest'
does not restrict the speech of those who are denied licenses; rather, it preserves the interests of
the 'people as a whole ... in free speech.' "(quoting RedLion, 395 U.S. at 390)), with Turner
1, 512 U.S. at 642 (discussing must-carry regulations for First Amendment purposes in terms of
the regulations' burden on the speaker, rather than the benefit of the viewing audience's receipt
of local programming), Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997) (discussing First
Amendment burdens placed on speakers by the Communications Decency Act), and Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[Tlhe
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In short, NCCB relies on presumptions that have been undermined by
technological advances and subsequent cases."'6 Its application to the present
media space is an attempt to cloak a policy preference with the infallibility of
constitutional law.
2. Physical Scarcity: A Failed Justification
The courts and the FCC have long relied on Red Lion v. FCC to support the
proposition that the First Amendment rights of broadcasters are inherently
limited because of the scarce nature of the broadcast spectrum that the
government allows them to use to cast their signals. With RedLion prevailing
as law and delineating a reduced level of First Amendment protection for
broadcasters, perhaps the Court would permit even a content-based regulation
to survive constitutional scrutiny as applied to those broadcasters. But as
judges have recognized, the scarcity doctrine has been under attack almost
from the moment it was adopted.16 In academia, liberal and conservative
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message."), cited in Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 n.9 (2007). Indeed, any valuation of the speech the "people" as
listeners may need to fulfill their democratic responsibilities is misplaced, since for the
marketplace of ideas metaphor to have any salience, the First Amendment must be agnostic as
to the kind or quality of the ideas or information that the speaker speaks and the listener receives.
161 The other case that advocates use to defend ownership regulation's reliance on diversity,
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), is similarly a thin reed, but for a different,
more fundamental reason. Associated Press was an antitrust case, not a First Amendment case.
The Court found that applying antitrust principles to the newspaper industry served, rather than
frustrated, certain First Amendment-derived principles. Id. at 20. It is an altogether different
proposition to claim that the First Amendment compels the government to ensure diversity in
broadcast ownership to protect the viewing public's constitutional interest in viewpoint diversity.
162 See, eg., Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). Even the Supreme Court has expressed its unease
with relying on the scarcity doctrine as justification for reduced First Amendment rights for
broadcasters. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984)
(stating that despite the advent of alternative video programming providers such as cable and
satellite, "[the Court is] not prepared... to reconsider its longstanding approach without some
signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required"). Justice Kennedy
discussed the scarcity doctrine in comparing First Amendment standards for cable and broadcast
in Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 638-40, but because the case dealt with the rights of cable carriers, the
Court was not faced with the issue directly; thus, its scarcity discussion was dicta. Some thought
the Court's recent grant of certiorari to review the FCC's regulation of broadcast indecency
during the October 2008 term-its first such case in more than thirty years-would signal its
intent to reconsider the scarcity regime, but only Justice Thomas indicated a willingness to
reconsider its continuing vitality. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S.
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commentators alike have demonstrated its speciousness on technological,
economic, and theoretical grounds. 63  Even the Commission itself has
questioned the doctrine's continuing salience."6  Indeed, television
broadcasters are in the midst of completing their transition from analog to
digital broadcasting-a technology that is, by any measure, a far more effective
and efficient way to allocate frequencies and broadcast sound and images. The
scarcity justification is therefore more vulnerable now than it has ever been.
There is no reason to add another snare to the drum beat here; it is sufficient
to state that if the Supreme Court were to revisit the issue of spectrum scarcity
today, it may well find that the broadcast spectrum is neither scarce nor any
more "owned" by the public than is a federally maintained park or lane on a
highway. Some reasonable limitations may be placed on its use, in other
words, but the mere fact of public "ownership" provides no justification for
reducing the constitutional standards to be applied to government action
affecting the users.'65 The government may own the delivery system for the
mail, but it does not rely on its ownership for placing limitations on who is
allowed to mail a letter.'66
Apr. 28, 2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court resolved the administrative law issue before
it without reaching the constitutional question but noted that it may well do so after the case is
heard on remand. See id. (majority opinion), at 25-26.
163 See, e.g., Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://www.balkin.blogspot.com
(search "Fairness Doctrine Part II") (Aug. 8,2007,08:00 EST) (noting that "[t]he scarcity theory
is spurious" because "[a]ll resources are scarce," but that other analytical rationales exist for
upholding broadcast regulation). For a compilation of these criticisms, including critiques by
other proponents of broadcast regulation, see Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and
the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 688, 719 n.232 (2005).
164 General Fairness Doctrine Obligations ofBroadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 145,152-53
(1985); Syracuse Pace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 74 (1987) ("[W]e no longer believe that
there is scarcity in the number of broadcast outlets available to the public.").
165 An entirely distinct First Amendment issue from regulating ownership ofbroadcast outlets
is the government's application of a licensing regime to broadcasters that would be wholly
inconsistent with settled freedom of the press principles in the print context. See generally
LUCAS A. PowE, JR., AMEICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49-101 (1987)
(detailing the development of broadcast licensing and related First Amendment jurisprudence).
Indeed, as Powe reminds us, the first-ever prevailing First Amendment plaintiff was Jay Near,
a Minnesota publisher who successfully challenged a state statute that the Supreme Court
analogized to prior licensing schemes. Id. at 19-21 (discussing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931)). The fact that Americans turn to television as their primary source for news adds a
particularly ironic gloss to the constitutional problems associated with licensing broadcast
outlets. See id. at 44-45 (discussing some problems, constitutional and otherwise, arising from
requiring licenses for broadcasters).
166 Distinguishing mail from a television station's news program, as an advocate of media
regulation might, is only partly responsive to this example. Newspapers, after all, are often
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C. Providing Alternatives
In addition to structural ownership limitations, governments have taken
other steps to help stem the perceived potential effects of a consolidated media
space. These measures, two of which are discussed here, are not direct
regulatory mechanisms, but the development of alternatives to private
ownership and its possible abuse. The first is the development and support of
a public broadcasting system alongside a private one. Where the public
broadcaster was a monopolist, public broadcasting was not strictly a
supplement to correct market failure, but a whole-cloth substitute for the
market itself. Where, as now, the public broadcaster operates in the same
market as the private broadcaster, the question shifts to whether a strong
multichannel public broadcast service with public service obligations serves to
mitigate consolidation's possible deleterious effects. The idea is the same: the
state, rather than the market, can best fulfill the public-interest obligations of
broadcasters and the information-disseminating potential of the medium. But
once the public broadcast system is used as an alternative to private stations for
public affairs information rather than the only choice, a question arises as to the
adequacy of the substitute.
Numerous researchers have demonstrated that public broadcasting viewers
are politically better informed than those who watch commercial
broadcasting.'67 However, there is simply no way of knowing which way the
delivered through the mail. But an argument that newspapers should have to cover all sides of
issues of public concern before they may use the government's delivery system, for example,
is a specious one. Judge Bork made a similar analogy:
A publisher can deliver his newspapers only because government provides
streets and regulates traffic on the streets by allocating rights of way. Yet no
one would contend that the necessity for these governmental functions, which
are certainly analogous to the government's function in allocating broadcast
frequencies, could justify regulation of the content of a newspaper to ensure
that it serves the needs of the citizens.
Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 509.
167 See, e.g., Holtz-Bacha & Norris, supra note 135, at 3 (finding that in Europe "watching
public television is associated with higher levels of political information than watching
commercial TV"). Holtz-Bacha and Norris, through multiple-regression analysis, controlled for
such variables as education, income, interest in politics, and frequency of consumption of
newspapers and radio. Id. at 20. However, a correlation between a preference for public
television and a higher knowledge of politics and international affairs does not necessarily mean
that the former causes the latter. As the study's authors acknowledge, their findings and analysis
cannot disprove the hypothesis that "the direction of causality runs from cognitive skills to media
use" rather than the other way around, and that "the more politically knowledgeable choose to
watch the more informative public TV news." Id. at 16.
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correlation runs. Study after study has also shown that public broadcasting
viewers have received more formal education, and their increased level of
knowledge could be attributable to other information products, such as
newspapers and newsmagazines, that the higher-educated are more likely to
consume in addition to their daily diet of PBS. None of this is to say that
public broadcasting does not serve the public interest; it only shows that, if
public broadcasting is intended to provide a substitute to the narrowing of
viewpoints on public affairs issues that consolidated ownership purportedly
causes, then the results on that score are inconclusive.
A related point-and one reason some have claimed that public television
serves as an inadequate substitute for market-based service-is private
broadcasting's deleterious effect on public service broadcasting.'68 Arguments
that the presence of competition with privately owned stations results in a
dumbing down of public service broadcaster programming across Western
Europe, however, prove too much. I doubt the majority of British viewers
would complain, for example, if BBC Four, looking to fill a timeslot in which
ITV has been particularly competitive, decided to rerun an episode of BBC
Two's "The Office" rather than yet another of Sir Henry Wood's Proms.'69 But
in the real world, such a programming choice would presumably never occur
because Ricky Gervais fans have their BBC Two, and Sir Henry Wood fans
have their BBC Four. It is oversimplistic to state that all four BBC channels
have diluted their programming quality in order to compete with more popular
programming on the private broadcaster and cable networks because a public
broadcaster can program its stations to reach distinct (though not exclusively
distinct) audiences'70 --just as a private broadcaster would program those same
168 See, e.g., DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE
MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS 274-75, 277 (2004) (leveling a typical charge: "In most
countries[,] ... commercial broadcasting had a majority of the audience and competition for
audience had significantly transformed public broadcasting as well, forcing it to adopt much of
the logic of the commercial system.... Increasingly even public broadcasting systems must
follow the logic of global cultural industries.").
169 A true Reithian regulator might respond that these Brits would choose Sir Wood over
Ricky Gervais if they knew which was better for them. But the point here is that in a
multichannel media space, there is sufficient capacity and opportunity for each to find its
audience.
"0 As their respective websites state, BBC Two "is a mixed-genre channel combining serious
factual and specialist subjects with inventive comedy and distinctive drama," BBC Statements
ofProgramme Policy, 2006/2007: BBC Two, http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/statements2006/tv/bbc
two.shtml (last visited May 14, 2009), while BBC Four
is for audiences in search of even greater depth and range in their viewing.
With an ambition to be British television's most intellectually and culturally
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channels. There is room on the dial to accommodate almost anyone's taste.
Also, the BBC may "compete" with ITV for viewers, but not for revenue or for
advertisers.' 7'
Clearly, however, not all broadcasting systems have the luxury of
differentiating their offerings. The "problem," if there is one, is in smaller
transition states where the public service broadcaster only has one channel and
the competition for eyeballs with newly established private stations is more
acute. But even in Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic,
Serbia, and Romania, the government has found room on the dial for up to
three terrestrial channels, one of which airs local reality shows and comedies;
it stocks the other channels with cultural and public interest programming. 172
Another approach, gaining currency as new communications technologies
develop, involves nonregulation, or light-touch regulation, of non-broadcast
media markets. The emergence of multichannel operations and the digital
media space, the argument goes, will obviate the need for media ownership
regulation beyond generally applicable competition law. The more channels
the better, and consumer choice can create a pluralistic marketplace of ideas far
better than any regulatory regime. Cable and satellite stations throughout
Europe and the United States will provide pluralism in the media marketplace
in a way that ownership regulation never could.' 7 Online media such as blogs
and independent websites also maximize consumer choice and correct any
possible market failure in the broadcast space due to consolidated ownership. 74
Some are doubtful of the Internet's capacity to correct for private ownership
by providing pluralism in the media marketplace, arguing that the Web serves
enriching channel, BBC Four balances a distinctive mix of documentary,
performance, music, film and topical features to offer a satisfying alternative
to more mainstream programming.
BBC Statements ofProgramme Policy 2006/2007: BBC Four, http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/statem
ents2006/tv/bbcfour.shtml (last visited May 14, 2009).
"' INDEPEN, APPRAISING THE PROPOSED BBC LICENSE FEE INCREASE, supra note 34, at 6-7.
172 TELEVISION ACROSS EUROPE, supra note 52, at summary 73.
173 See generally Mark Armstrong, Public Service Broadcasting, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.
econ.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/armstrong/psb.pdf (arguing that subscription television solves prior
market failures, thus removing a justification for broadcast regulation). Such arguments tend
to rely on a different conception of public service broadcasting than the current understanding,
at least in the United Kingdom. Indeed, as the number of channels increases and the television
market becomes more fragmented, the license fee regime becomes more susceptible to criticism
from consumers who claim they do not use license fee-funded channels such as the BBC and
should therefore not be forced by the government to subsidize them.
' See, e.g., Wolfgang Truetzschler, The Internet: A New Mass Medium?, in MEDIA POLICY:
CONVERGENCE, CONCENTRATION, AND COMMERCE 75, 77-79 (Denis McQuail & Karen Siune,
eds., 1998) (remarking on the Internet's capacity to enhance democratic discourse).
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as a complementary or duplicative media outlet rather than a substitutive one.
More critically, Cass Sunstein argues that the Internet, by affording the user
seamless power to self-select and filter out content, can do harm to deliberative
democracy.17 Before accepting such a claim, though, one might ask how many
of those using the Internet for news and information were previously filtering
the content they viewed or read via "old" media. Since we cannot know the
answer to that question, it is difficult, if not impossible, to show other than in
a theoretical sense that new media's echo chambers might cause us to
deliberate less or be exposed to fewer alternative points of view.
D. The Self-Regulation Alternative
The reason many of the mechanisms described above are generally
unsatisfying, or cannot be shown to work, either theoretically or on their own
terms, is that they share misdirected aim. To repeat, the real problem with
consolidation, assuming there is one, is not "excessive" ownership in and of
itself, but the danger of an owner who owns an "excessive" number of outlets
imposing his or her views on his or her media outlets. The most focused target
for a remedy is therefore not at the point where the owner purchases the outlet,
but at the point where the owner can exercise the control over the outlet.
Self-regulatory mechanisms have traditionally been used in the United
States to govern private broadcasters' conduct regarding journalistic ethics and
in programming areas such as the advertising of alcoholic beverages and time-
zoning of content deemed inappropriate for children. 7 6 Other countries also
rely on private agreements to effect voluntary separation of ownership and
control in order to counteract the possibly deleterious effects of media
influence. In Norway the Redaktorplakaten oversatt tileugelsk, or the Rights
and Duties of the Editor, a declaration adopted in 1953 by the Association of
Norwegian Editors and the Norwegian Media Business Association, states that
editors "shall promote an impartial and free exchange of information and
opinion" and are entitled to "a free and independent leadership of the editorial
[department] and editorial work and full freedom to shape the opinions of the
paper even if they in single matters are not always shared by the publisher or
175 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBUC.COM 56-60 (2002).
"' Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 720, 729,
733, 744 (1999).
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the board.""' Owners make similar pledges not to interfere excessively with
the newsgathering and editorial functions.'
Support among Norwegian journalists for the Redaktorplakaten has not
been unqualified, as some have complained about the lack of symmetry in the
obligations it imposes upon journalists and outlet owners. For example, while
an editor who finds herself with views irreconcilable with the paper's owner
or publisher is called upon to resign, nothing prevents an owner from firing an
editor who disagrees with her position. 79 But private agreements such as the
Redaktorplakaten can establish norms within the industry and cultures of
editorial independence that it is in owners' economic interest to follow. The
most popular media outlets are generally those with the most talented staff, and
top-rank journalists would tend to gravitate toward media outlets where their
editorial independence is expressly protected from excessive ownership
interference. And where owners violate the agreement, noisy withdrawals by
editors and journalists could preclude further breaches. Of course,
nonsignatories to the agreement would not be bound, but the public censure
that would accompany a board ruling adverse to an owner might serve as a
significant deterrent to any future exercises of inappropriate control. Both the
owner and his outlets would lose credibility in the eyes of media consumers.
More importantly, they could lose journalists and viewers who placed a
premium on independence.
There are historical precedents for a similar system in the United States.
Following a self-regulation model similar to what the National Association of
I7 Norsk Journalistlag, Rights and Duties of the Editor, http://www.nj.no/English/?module=
Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=4675 (last visited May 14, 2009). In the United
Kingdom, a self-regulation entity, the Press Complaints Commission, establishes a code of
conduct for journalists and hears and resolves complaints from the public. It was established
after British MPs essentially told journalists to either establish a self-regulatory regime for
protecting privacy and establishing a right of reply or be subjected to one by the government.
See Torin Douglas, Battle to Raise Standards, BBCNEws, Feb. 7,2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/uk/l 157911 .stm; Press Complaints Commission, http://www.pcc.org.uk/index2.html (click
"Code of Practice" or "Making a Complaint") (last visited May 14, 2009).
"78 Norsk Journalistlag, supra note 177. Public broadcasting systems in the United States
separate ownership from editorial independence in their organizational documents as a matter
of both practice and policy. See, e.g., Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033,
1040-41 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the editorial freedom enjoyed by public broadcasters).
'" As one commentator stated during the debate on whether to incorporate the agreement into
law, under the declaration, "the owners have power without responsibility, and the editors have
responsibility without power." Asle Rolland, The Norwegian Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of the Editor-from Private Arrangement to Public Law, 7 (Mar. 2005) (manuscript,
available at http://web.bi.no/forskning%/5Cpapers.nsffwDiscussionPapers/ (click"2005 ," follow
link to article)).
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Broadcasters (NAB) has used in the past, the industry could set up, in
collaboration with media-focused public interest groups, a commission
designed to establish guidelines on editorial independence that all stations and
station owners could be encouraged to follow. A complaints system could be
used to report incidents of excessive owner influence if, for example, an owner
discouraged an editor or reporter from covering a story that could directly
affect the owner's economic interest, or if an owner sought to influence an
editorial writer to express an opinion consistent with his own. A review board,
made up of an equal number of news directors, editors, management, and
owners, could hear complaints of improper influence filed by editors and
reporters." 0 Retaliatory fnings or other discipline could be discouraged.
A recent major media transaction utilized a private agreement to preclude
excessive owner influence over editorial decisions: Rupert Murdoch's
summer 2007 purchase of the Wall Street Journal. Reports indicated that
Murdoch's agreement with the Bancroft family for a controlling interest in the
Journal's parent company, Dow Jones & Company, provided that the pre-
purchase managing editors and editing page editor of the Journal would remain
in place after consummation of the transaction and would have exclusive
authority over staffing and content.' News Corporation could not remove any
of those editors without preapproval from a special committee established by
News Corporation and the Bancrofts. s2 In the case of the Journal, it is the
very independence and quality of the paper that the agreement protects and for
which Murdoch paid a premium. 83 Murdoch, as aware of this fact as any
astronomically successful media magnate might be, was vocal regarding his
intent to retain the Journal's editorial leadership during his courtship of the
Bancrofts."'
Whether the agreement will preserve the paper's independence has been an
open question. As one commentator noted, the agreement "was flawed, in that
it anticipated, if not actually required, that the Journal's managing editor would
' In the mid- 1930s, the NAB set up a voluntary Radio Code, which called for, among other
regulations, close supervision of children's content, balanced coverage of controversial issues,
and limitations on advertising. A Compliance Committee was established for enforcement
purposes. Later, a Television Code was adopted, setting out advertising guidelines and issuing
rulings on the compliance of programs and commercials. Both Codes were repealed, however,
when the Department of Justice filed suit against the NAB claiming the Codes as applied to
advertisers violated antitrust laws. Campbell, supra note 176, at 721-23.
18' Richard Pdrez-Pefia, I Rupert, WillNot... ThatIs, UntilIDo, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22,2007,
at4.
182 Id.
183 Ken Auletta, Promises, Promises, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 43.
184 Id.
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want to protect his or her autonomy, at least enough to file a complaint with the
committee in the event the M.E.'s autonomy was infringed upon."'85 The
managing editor in place at the time the agreement was entered into resigned
before any interference meriting a complaint arose. 86 The point for present
purposes is that the agreement was negotiated between the buyer and seller,
rather than mandated by government regulation. In the end it will be the
Journal's readership, and its owner's stock price, that will determine whether
the newspaper is sufficiently insulated from interference or whether it is merely
a tool for the influence-peddling of its visible owner and his business interests.
Another currently used private model for separating ownership from control
in a media entity is the media trust, the most notable of which is the Scott
Trust, owner of the British-based, left-leaning Guardian newspaper. John
Scott, owner of the then-Manchester Guardian in the mid-nineteen thirties,
established a trust to ensure the Guardian's independence from excessive
ownership influence (like any trustor, he also did so to avoid estate taxes). 1 '
The Scott Trustees perform the paper's executive functions but are barred from
interfering with "the financial and editorial independence of The Guardian in
perpetuity: as a quality national newspaper without party affiliation."'88
Trustees appoint editors, monitor the corporate parent Guardian Media Group's
management of finances, and occasionally sit as a "court of appeal" in disputes
between editorial and management branches of the paper. As a recent article
in the Columbia Journalism Review noted, a number of local American papers,
such as Manchester, New Hampshire's Union Leader and Alabama's Anniston
Star, are also owned by nonprofits or in trust. 189 While the trust model is not
as widely used in the broadcast context, a trust or nonprofit-like structure that
interposes a decision making layer between ownership and the news
department might preclude station owners from exercising excessive influence
over news content while shedding light on possible ownership conflicts of
interest.
There are many owner exercises of control that even a self-regulation
regime should not reach. Owners may well choose to utilize their outlets to
express their opinions on issues of public concern, or even to influence public
opinion; such are the prerogatives of property ownership. But any concern
185 Dean Starkman, Brauchli's Baggage: What He Would Carry to the Washington Post,
COLUM. J. REv., June 25, 2008.
186 Id.
' See Guardian Media Group: The Scott Trust, Trustees, http://www.gmgplc.co.uk/ScottTr
ust/TheTrustees/tabid/195/Default.aspx (last visited June 10, 2009).
188 Id.
189 Charles Lewis, The Nonprofit Road, COLUM. J. REv., Sept./Oct. 2007, 33, 34.
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associated with those prerogatives has a relatively straightforward solution, one
that many stations already engage in as a matter of industry practice:
disclosure. As Justice Scalia has noted in the analogous context of campaign
finance reform, "[t]he premise of the First Amendment is that the American
people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both
the substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate
source."' 9 °  Here, as in politics, "[e]vil corporate (and private affluent)
influences are well enough checked" by internal regulations requiring, for
example, that a station disclose where an investigative story might implicate an
owner's investments, or that a commentator's opinions reflect those of the
station owner or general manager.'9 ' And a particular station's lack of such
controls could be disclosed and discussed by its competitors. Consider the
following illustration:
STATION ] NEWS STOR Y: "A study has recently shown that tea
is better for you than coffee."
NEWSPAPER 1 STORY (Newspaper 1 and Station 1 share the
same owner): "A study has recently shown that tea is better for
you than coffee."
STATION 2 NEWS EDITORIAL: "Last night, Station 1 ran a story
about tea. Newspaper 1 ran the same story this morning. Station
1 and Newspaper 1 share the same owner, and he also owns
Company 1, which manufactures teakettles. Neither Station 1 nor
Newspaper 1 has any policies preventing reporting in areas where
there is a possible conflict of interest. Station 2, on the other
hand, has a policy ensuring its editors and reporters would never
have such a conflict. We believe these policies are critical to
190 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas highlighted a similar sentiment in the broadcast
context:
The implication that the people of this country-except the proponents of the
theory-are mere unthinking automatons manipulated by the media, without
interests, conflicts or prejudices is an assumption which I find quite
maddening. The development of constitutional doctrine should not be based
on such hysterical overestimation of media power and underestimation of the
good sense of the American public.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94, 152 n.3 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting Louis L. Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections ofFairness
&Access, 85 HARv. L. REv. 768, 786-87 (1972)).
191 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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keeping you informed. Therefore, if you want your news
unfiltered, you should watch Station 2."
Even with such self-regulatory controls in place, in a country with few
private broadcast outlets, an owner like Silvio Berlusconi could pursue his
interests by other means, namely by appointing editors and other high-level
decision makers who are sympathetic to his concerns. 9 2 In this arrangement,
there is no dispute between the owner and editor, since they share the same
goal. 93 But even with effective control over the six most popular television
stations in Italy, Berlusconi could maintain a continuous hold on power;
indeed, he returned to power even after losing ultimate control over RAI. And,
as noted, part of the problem was the limited number of private Italian
broadcast outlets, such that it was fairly simple for one owner to consolidate
control over nearly fifty percent of the viewing audience. A licensing system
with lower barriers to entry might have led to more private outlets, and a
concurrent diffusion of Berlusconi's sway over Italian television. In addition,
had the government been willing to divest itself of one of the RAI stations to
a private licensee back in the 1970s or 1980s, perhaps Berlusconi would have
been less able to consolidate influence. A meaningful enforcement of
competition law may have also curtailed the problem. Because of the
longstanding RAI monopoly, there was no tradition of independence in the
broadcasting context as there was in the print sector. It was therefore
particularly susceptible to influence once a media baron eager to exercise
power over television ascended to the prime ministership.
Apart from inter-industry efforts, non-governmental third-party actors can
also have a role in developing self-regulation policies. In a report entitled
Broadcast Freedom and the State, the Commission on Radio and Television
Policy at the Carter Center, an advisory group established to assist new
democracies in Eastern Europe develop media policies, recommended self-
regulation practices such as allowing advertising rates for both public and
private channels to be set by market rates. 94 The Commission also
192 Former Russian President Vladimir Putin's high poll ratings have similarly coincided with
increasing Kremlin control over Russia's public broadcasters. See Steven Lee Myers, On
Russian TV, Whatever Putin Wants, He Gets, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2004, at Al.
"' In the context of history, the owner/publisher pamphleteer example, supra Part IV, is also
relevant here. See also supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
'94 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RADIO AND TELEVISION POLICY, BROADCAST FREEDOM
AND THE STATE 4 (1994), available at http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/dewitt/pdfs/rtvcl
994_rec.pdf. The advertising rate controls were designed so as not to allow public broadcasters,
whose costs are partly defrayed by governmental subsidy, a competitive advantage.
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recommended measures to ensure independence from state or private
ownership, and called for the creation of buffer organizations to mediate
between government and the media so as to insulate broadcasters from state
influence. 95 While many of these initiatives presume a preordained regulatory
framework that contemplates a role for government intervention, they do
recognize that independent actors in the media space are more responsive to
and responsible for exertion-of-influence concerns than regulators. They
incubate a new media space guided by principles of competition rather than
public monopoly.
V. CONCLUSION
Consider one final hypothetical. WSEL, a television station in Springville,
is for sale. WSEL's transition to digital broadcasting and other economic
challenges associated with operating a television station in a modestly sized
city such as Springville has left it in financial straits. Two years ago, it pared
its once award-winning news operation back to a single half-hour weeknight
newscast at eleven p.m., and it is considering shutting its newsroom down to
save costs.
There are three prospective buyers of WSEL. One is the owner of WAAA,
a strong CBS network affiliate and the top-rated station in the mid-sized
Springville market. WAAA has longstanding ties to the Springville
community, and its owner has an established history of investing in news and
supporting local nonprofits with employee contributions. Its local public
affairs program, "Eye on Springville," has aired weekly for the past twenty
years, and it sponsors a dozen House and Senate debates for local races each
election cycle. Its weekend anchor formerly hosted the evening news on
WSEL and is much beloved by local viewers. On fall Friday nights, no one
covers Springville high school football better.
Another prospective buyer is the ninety-year-old Springville Herald, a
family-owned newspaper in Springville whose connections to the town run
similarly deep. The Herald's editorial staff is the largest newsgathering
organization in the state and its reporters have won regional and national
awards for their investigative work. Both WAAA and the Herald are
committed to restarting WSEL's once-proud local newscast, both out of a
commitment to community service and out of economic sense, since investing
in local news is a proven route to profitability. Unlike most media companies
in smaller markets, they have the cash on hand and are ready to spend it. In
195 Id. at 2.
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addition, both have pledged to keep their newsrooms completely distinct from
that of WSEL, and have agreements in place ensuring the editorial
independence of their news operations from ownership.
A third prospective buyer owns WBBB, an unaffiliated television
station 600 miles from Springville, in a town called Lewisburg. WBBB has no
news programming, and it does not participate in or support local events. Its
website is bare-bones; it lists no community events or contact information for
its newsroom staff. Its owner holds no media properties in Springville's state
and has no plans to bring WSEL back to anything above marginal profitability.
It plans to do so by selling the station's weekend airtime to a subsidiary of the
Home Shopping Network. Under the FCC's ownership rules, WBBB's owner
will win the station. Both WAAA and the Herald will be barred from doing
SO. 196
This Article has focused on the legal and theoretical implications associated
with governmentally imposed broadcast ownership controls. But the example
illustrates an efficiency issue: even though the Communications Act obligates
the FCC to award television licenses consistent with the public interest, its rules
often preclude the very kind of transactions that would most be in that interest.
Media theory, as manifested by the ownership presumption, defeats reality.
Like other Western countries, the United States government regulates the
ownership of private media outlets to influence what those outlets might say.
It may not write the music for the singers, but it does choose who gets to sing.
The interest in either case, however, is to try and ensure the audience hears a
certain kind of music. In part, this Article has sought to illustrate that to square
the government's method for selecting singers with the First Amendment, we
must first define, with clarity and precision, its interest in the song.
196 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b), (d) (2008).
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